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Hard Cases Make Bad Law?
A Theoretical Investigation
Sepehr Shahshahani∗

Abstract
I use formal models to probe the aphorism that “hard cases make bad law.” The analysis
illuminates important features of the common law process, especially the influence of
case characteristics on lawmaking and the role of strategic litigators. When a case
raises concerns that are not reflected in doctrine, the court might distort the law to
avoid a hardship. Distortion is more likely when the case is important or the facts
are close to the border of legality. Litigators may exploit courts’ attention to extradoctrinal concerns by strategically selecting cases for litigation. Surprisingly, though,
a strategic litigator improves lawmaking relative to random case selection—even when
her preferences are far from the ideal rule—if her influence over case selection is modest.
The effect is more nuanced when the strategic litigator has greater selection power.
Finally, the analysis incorporates a judicial hierarchy with asymmetric information
and factfinding discretion.
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“Hard cases make bad law” is one of the most famous aphorisms in Anglo-American law.
Courts and commentators are not always clear about what they mean by it, but its basic
logic is as follows: Where strict application of a generally sound law would present a special
hardship to someone, the court is tempted to distort the law to avoid the hardship. This
paper presents a series of formal models of adjudication that make this logic precise and
probe it, revealing nuances that would not be appreciated by informal analysis alone. There
is some intrinsic interest in unpacking this oft-quoted maxim. More importantly, the analysis
uses the aphorism as a vehicle to illuminate larger questions about judicial lawmaking. A
fundamental feature of the common law process is that general law is made in the context of
particular cases, such that courts’ lawmaking and dispute-settling functions are inextricable.
The insights of this paper come from appreciating this linkage and what it implies—namely,
that a few cases’ particular characteristics can exert great influence on generally applicable
law. Given the motivation, I will focus on characteristics that are usefully classified under
the rubric of hardness.
Three senses of “hard” are considered: (1) special hardship, meaning salient facts that
cannot be explicitly reflected in relevant doctrine; (2) importance, meaning not the importance of the law at issue but the importance of the dispute; (3) difficulty or closeness,
meaning how close the facts of the case are to running afoul of the law. I show that when
a case does not pose a special hardship, importance and difficulty do not make a difference
to lawmaking quality. But when a case poses a special hardship, important cases are more
likely than unimportant cases, and difficult cases are more likely than easy cases, to make
bad law. However, conditional on making bad law, difficult cases make less-bad law than
easy cases.
As mentioned, these results flow from the critical linkage of lawmaking and disputesettling in the common law process. I also investigate another critical feature of judicial
lawmaking—that courts make law by resolving cases brought to them by others. This highlights the role of “impact litigators” (also called “cause lawyers”), meaning lawyers whose
primary goal is not that a particular client should win but that the law should take a particular shape. Impact litigators can move the law closer to their liking by strategically
selecting cases for litigation with an eye to how particular case characteristics affect general
1
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laws. I show that this process is more conducive to good lawmaking the closer the litigator’s
preferred rule is to the hypothetical ideal rule. Surprisingly, though, impact litigation improves lawmaking relative to random case selection—even when the litigator’s preferred rule
is maximally far from the ideal rule—as long as the litigator has modest influence over case
selection. The intuition is that in filtering out cases that would make bad law from her own
perspective, the impact litigator also tends to filter out cases that would make bad law from
the perspective of the ideal rule; in expectation, her case selection circumvents the tendency
of courts to let hard cases make bad law. This logic holds as long as the impact litigator’s
power over case selection is modest—that is, as long as she is not free to hold off until she
finds a case that will settle the law very close to her ideal rule.
Impact litigators’ impact on lawmaking quality is more nuanced when their influence
over case selection is greater. The analysis identifies three distinct regimes, depending on
the proximity of the litigator’s ideal rule to the ideal rule. For litigators with strong prosocial
preferences, society is always better off with impact litigators than without, and increasing
selection power always improves lawmaking. For litigators with moderately prosocial preferences, society is still always better off with impact litigators than without; however, increasing selection power is welfare-enhancing up to a point but becomes welfare-reducing after
that point. For litigators with extreme preferences, increasing selection power is welfareenhancing up to a point but becomes welfare-reducing after that point; moreover, though
modest selection power is better than having no impact litigator, having no impact litigator
is better than an extremely powerful litigator.
I also explore whether hard cases make bad law in a judicial hierarchy where trial courts
have some discretion in factfinding. Trial courts are better positioned than appellate courts
to observe case facts, and appellate courts defer substantially to their findings of fact. Informational asymmetry, trial courts’ strategic factfinding, and appellate courts’ strategically
responsive rulemaking complicate the single-court analysis. Unlike the single-court context,
in a judicial hierarchy some cases that do not pose a special hardship may make bad law.
Moreover, the effect of difficulty is nonmonotonic: The cases that are most likely to make
bad law are intermediately difficult—not the easiest cases but not the hardest cases either.
Finally, when bad law is made, it is bad not only in the sense of diverging from the appellate
2
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court’s ideal rule but in the stronger sense of being Pareto-dominated for both courts.
This work relates closely to two strands of literature. The first is the “case space” approach pioneered by Kornhauser (1992) and now common in judicial politics (see Lax (2011)
for a review). In this framework, the court decides a case, which consists of a set of facts,
by announcing a rule that partitions the fact space; cases falling on one side of the rule get
one disposition (plaintiff wins) and those on the other side get another disposition (plaintiff
loses). The great virtue of Kornhauser’s framework is its recognition that lawmaking (deciding the governing law) and dispute settling (deciding the case’s disposition) are different
but inextricably linked. My analysis exploits this key feature by showing how various characteristics of a particular dispute shape the law that is made in the context of that dispute
but will apply more broadly. Other papers have also fruitfully exploited this potentiality
of case space. For example, Carrubba and Clark (2012) integrate both rule and disposition
components into a court’s payoff function, and Shahshahani (2021) shows how trial courts’
fact discretion sharpens appellate courts’ rule-disposition tradeoff.
In the case space literature, Lax (2012) is close to the present work in investigating
lawmaking in an environment of imperfect doctrine by modeling a second dimension of
facts that is not fully incorporated into law. But the two works focus on different aspects
of lawmaking. Lax (2012) allows for improving the visibility of the second dimension by
costly investment, and more generally for two-dimensional doctrine, which enables him to
investigate the choice between a rule and a standard. In my model, by contrast, doctrinal
imperfection is so severe that the second dimension simply cannot be reflected in doctrine
(at a non-prohibitive cost), so the rules-versus-standards tradeoff is not considered. The
central tradeoff in my basic model, in line with its purpose of investigating how specific case
characteristics influence general lawmaking, is between the right disposition in the present
case and the right rule for future cases. By contrast, particular case characteristics are not
important to lawmaking in Lax (2012); “salience” in that model means the salience of the
issue area, not of a particular case, which impacts how much the court invests in lawmaking
but does not create any sort of rule-disposition tradeoff. Beyond the benchmark model,
my analysis of impact litigators has no analogue in Lax (2012), and my analysis of judicial
hierarchy is different in fully modeling lower courts as strategic actors.
3
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The second strand of related literature is the body of work on the evolution of common
law. Since early in the inception of law and economics, scholars have claimed that the
common law gropes toward efficiency (e.g., Posner (1973), Rubin (1977), Priest (1977)).
Though some of the early works could be criticized for exceedingly strong assumptions (see
Kornhauser (1980)), they contained insights that were incorporated into more sophisticated
models of litigation that generated somewhat optimistic, though more modest and refined,
results (e.g., Cooter, Kornhauser and Lane (1979), Cooter and Kornhauser (1980), Gennaioli
and Shleifer (2007), Baker and Mezzetti (2012)). The present work is not necessarily more
pessimistic about the trajectory of common law, but it focuses on the conditions that make
the law go awry. Three distinguishing features enhance this focus. First, where this literature
emphasizes the malleability of the law, I emphasize its stickiness. Here the law is really law
in the sense that future judges cannot change it at will. Of course, both approaches contain
stylized assumptions, and one or the other may be more appropriate depending on the
context. (Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) take a middle ground where future judges cannot
change one dimension of the law but can introduce a second dimension, at which point the law
as a whole becomes fixed.) Second, the present paper is attentive to how the characteristics
of a particular case influence general law. In the common law efficiency literature, case
characteristics are not modeled; cases are generic objects, distinguished, if at all, only by
whether they cross the line into illegality. But in the present model, in line with longstanding
lawyerly intuitions, the court is liable to be influenced by the particular attributes of the
parties and the case before it—even attributes that are not technically relevant under the
law. That is why there is room for bad lawmaking even though I incorporate the strong
assumption of a benevolent and knowledgeable court, an assumption that is lacking in some
of the more refined common law models. Third, building on the second point, the model
introduces an analysis of how strategic litigation impacts the quality of lawmaking through
selection of cases to litigate. Baker and Biglaiser (2014) also model impact litigation, but
they focus on whether impact litigators will seek incremental or dramatic change and do not
consider how particular case characteristics might affect the law.
Section 1 reviews the origins and usage of the aphorism. Section 2 constructs a series
of formal models to clarify, enrich, contest, and extend the qualitative insights. Section 3
4
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discusses implications and extensions with case studies from diverse areas of law, pulling in
substantive and procedural doctrine. Among other things, I show how the model complements the traditional justification for equity. Apart from avoiding the hardship to particular
parties that would result from strict application of law, equity preserves good law by giving
courts a way to avoid the hardship without having to distort the law. Section 4 concludes.

1

Origins and Usage

The aphorism was apparently first used in English cases in the early 19th Century (see
Heuston (1978)). In Hodgens v. Hodgens (1837) 4 CI Fin. 323, a husband whose wealthy
wife had left him petitioned the court for maintenance of their children out of her property,
claiming his own resources were insufficient. The law at the time did not impose any duty
on the mother while the father was alive. Nevertheless, a court in Dublin ruled in favor of
the father so the children would not become destitute. The House of Lords reversed, Lord
Wynford remarking as follows: “We have heard that hard cases make bad law. This is an
extremely hard case, but it would indeed be making bad law . . . if your Lordships affirmed
this order” (id. at 378). Lord Wynford expressed the hope that the wife would still feel
bound by “the law of God and nature . . . suitably to maintain those children”; but, as far
as courts are concerned, “we have to decide this case according to the law” (id. at 377-78).
In Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 10 M. & W. 109, a coach driver who was injured in
an accident sued the person who had furnished the coach, claiming the accident was caused
by latent defects in the coach. The court dismissed the suit because any duty to keep the
coach safe was owed to the person who contracted for the coach to be furnished, not to the
driver. Baron Rolff wrote, “it is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a
remedy, but, by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has been
frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law” (id. at 116).
A modern case nicely illustrates the same idea. Cindy Lee Garcia sued YouTube to take
down the trailer for a movie in which she had briefly appeared, claiming she owned the
copyright in her performance. The suit would be a sure loser under ordinary circumstances
given Garcia’s minimal contribution to the film. It’s well settled that authorship of a “joint
5
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work” under the Copyright Act resides only in a creative “master mind” with “artistic
control” over the work, which “limit[s] authorship [in movies] to someone at the top of the
screen credits, sometimes the producer, sometimes the director, possibly the star, or the
screenwriter” (Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000)). The rationale
is that a more inclusive standard of authorship would impose immense transaction costs,
especially in movies, which involve huge production teams (id.). But these were no ordinary
circumstances. The film at issue was Innocence of the Muslims, which depicted the Muslim
prophet Muhammad as a murderer and pedophile and caused worldwide protests. Garcia
had no idea what she was getting into when she answered a casting call for an action flick
set in the Arabian desert, and her lines were later dubbed over to insult Muhammad. She
received numerous death threats after the trailer was posted on YouTube. In view of Garcia’s
grave predicament, a panel of the Ninth Circuit twisted copyright doctrine to rule in her favor
(Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014)).
Hodgens, Winterbottom, and Garcia capture the essence of the aphorism: When a case
presents a special hardship, the court is tempted to bend a generally sound law to avoid the
hardship, resulting in a law that, though perhaps fine for the case at hand, is unsound as a
general rule. That is how most commentators understand the maxim (e.g., Garner (2011),
403; Heuston (1978), 31; Radin (1938), 40-42).1
But that does not express all there is to the qualitative insight. Consider also Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), involving an antitrust challenge by
President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration to the merger of competing railroad companies that resulted in the formation of the Northern Securities holding company, the world’s
largest company at the time. The Supreme Court invalidated the combination, holding that
mergers between directly competing firms are per se illegal. Justice Holmes wrote in dissent
(id. at 400-401):
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not
by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of
some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings
1

Schauer (2006) runs farther with the idea, arguing that because cases (not just cases posing a special
hardship) are unrepresentative of the range of problems that the law would be called upon to resolve, caseby-case lawmaking makes bad law.
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and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic
pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which
even well settled principles of law will bend.
This is the most-cited articulation of the maxim. What it adds to the Hodgens-WinterbottomGarcia intuition is the idea of a case’s “great”ness or importance. A case posing a special
hardship always tempts judges to distort the law to avoid the hardship, but the temptation
is easier to resist when the hardship is local. Hence the opinions in Hodgens and Winterbottom, which recognize the distortionary temptation only to rebuff it. In Garcia, too, the
Ninth Circuit took the case en banc and reversed the panel decision, apparently able to resist
the distortionary pressure given that the hardship was imposed on only one person (Garcia
v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc)). When the hardship relates to a
pressing public concern, however, the temptation is harder to resist. Hence, as Holmes saw
it, the majority’s succumbing to antimonopoly sentiment and veering from the sound path of
law in Northern Securities. (Of course, this is not to endorse Holmes’s position in Northern
Securities, much less the rules of Hodgens and Winterbottom; the point is rather to get a
feel for judicial usage of the aphorism.)
These cases, taken together, capture the meaning of “hard cases make bad law” as generally used.2 Judicial usage, then, suggests two senses of a “hard” case: a case that poses a
special hardship and a case whose outcome is particularly important.
But there is a third sense of “hard” in legal discourse, meaning “difficult” (or “close”),
the opposite of “easy.” A hard case in this sense is a case that is not readily resolvable by
reference to precedent or other authorities. As Ronald Dworkin put it in a famous article
of the same title, “hard cases” are those in which “no settled rule dictates a decision either
way” (Dworkin (1975), 1060). The question of how judges should go about deciding hard
2

This was confirmed by canvassing all references to the aphorism in Supreme Court opinions. E.g., United
States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37, 49 (1877) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Allen v. Morgan Cnty., 103 U.S. 515 (1880);
F.C.C. v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 528 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 753 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Nixon v. Admin. Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 505 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 98 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Skinner v.
Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 654-55 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Ry.
Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Board of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S.
668, 710 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting); Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 651 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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cases is central to the field of jurisprudence (e.g., Dworkin (1975); Posner (2002); Shapiro
(2007)) and also surfaces in judges’ writing (e.g., Sutton (2010), who helpfully uses the term
“close” cases). To my knowledge, the aphorism has never been used to mean “difficult cases
make bad law.”3 Nevertheless, one may wonder how the difficulty of a case influences the
quality of lawmaking, and how difficulty interacts with the other two senses of hardness.
These questions will be addressed in my formal analysis.

2

Models

Having surveyed the usage of judges and commentators, we have rich enough intuition to
build on. Sections 2.1-2.3 take on board the qualitative intuitions and sharpen them with
the aid of some formalism, showing the effects of special hardship, importance, and difficulty.
Subsequent sections go beyond the choice-theoretic context assumed by the aphorism, using
game theory to analyze impact litigators (§§ 2.4-2.5) and judicial hierarchy (§ 2.6).

2.1

Building Blocks

We now analytically conceptualize every word of the saying.
Hard. All three senses of hardness are considered. Special hardship is conceptualized as a
latent dimension of case facts that, for whatever reason (e.g., administrability or evidentiary
considerations), cannot be explicitly reflected in legal doctrine. Importance is conceptualized
as how much the court cares about the case’s disposition. (Note well that this refers to the
intrinsic dispositional importance of the case, in line with Holmes’s notion of “immediate
overwhelming interest,” not its doctrinal importance.) And difficulty is conceptualized as
the closeness of the case to the court’s ideal cutpoint rule.
Cases. In accordance with the case space approach, a case is modeled as a bundle of
3

However, Justice Stevens was fond of “easy cases make bad law.” E.g., Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604, 640 (1990); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 718 (1992); Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S. 93, 106 (1997). In using this variation, Justice Stevens seemed to think he is inverting the traditional
expression, which is not right because the opposite of “hard” in the traditional usage is not “easy.” Other
Justices have also used the variation and attempted to articulate a rationale for it—e.g., O’Bannon v. Town
Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 804 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 840 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring)—but pursuing this line of thought would take us too far afield.
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facts. Or, more precisely, of facts that are or should be legally relevant. Going back to the
Hodgens case, the law (or rule) specifies the wife and husband’s respective shares of financial
child-maintenance duties. (Specifically, the Hodgens court’s rule was that the wife’s share
of duties is 0, but one can imagine a rule imposing any share.) The case would then consist
of what share of maintenance was actually borne by the wife in the controversy before the
court, and the court’s rule would generate a disposition of the case, meaning a determination
of whether or not the wife is in compliance with her legal duties. For higher-dimensional
rules (e.g., if the allocation of maintenance duties also depended on the spouses’ wealth),
the case would be modeled as a higher-dimensional bundle of facts. More precisely, a case
x is a point in fact space X ⊂ Rn , and a rule r is a hyperplane dividing the fact space into
two half spaces, each corresponding to a disposition d ∈ {0, 1}.
Make. The idea of a case making law presupposes that the rule of the case will apply
beyond that case. In Hodgens, for example, the court cannot just say the wife wins (or loses),
but must specify an allocation of maintenance duties—a rule—that makes the wife win (or
lose). Moreover, this rule applies not just to the Hodgenses but to future parties as well.
Bad. Badness captures the extent to which the dispositions produced by the law over the
expected run of future cases overlap with the dispositions that would have been produced by
the court’s ideal rule. For example, in one-dimensional fact space, where rules take the form
of cutpoints, the badness of a rule is captured by how close it is to the ideal rule.4 I do not
offer a normative theory of what constitutes good or bad law; rather, taking the normative
benchmark of good law as given, and assuming that the court is interested in attaining it, I
show when and to what extent hard cases will cause the court to deviate from good law.
Law. As discussed above, a “law” means a rule that divides the fact space into half spaces
corresponding to two dispositions (win or lose).
Utility function. Given the qualitative discussion, we must make clear that the court
cares both about the disposition of the case at hand and about the rule made by the case
4

I will assume throughout that case facts are uniformly distributed over the fact space, as is common in
the literature (e.g., Lax (2003), Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007); Beim, Hirsch and Kastellec (2014)). A similar
exercise could be carried out for an arbitrary distribution (with appropriate assumptions about its support
and density), but the uniform distribution is simple and allows for a clean focus on the effects of hardness.
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(i.e., the disposition of future cases). In one-dimensional fact space, this is captured by
U = −|r − H| + e1{d = dH }

(1)

where r is the rule of the case, H is the court’s ideal rule, and e is the dispositional payoff,
which accrues if and only if the disposition of the case (d) conforms to the court’s ideal
disposition (dH ). Ideal disposition means the disposition demanded by the court’s ideal rule:

dH =



1

if x < H


0

if x ≥ H

.

(2)

So the first term in Equation (1) is the court’s rule utility and the second term is disposition
utility, with e capturing the case’s importance (i.e., the ratio of disposition utility to rule
utility). Note that the court’s payoff function reflects a certain myopia. A judge with a long
horizon—meaning one who is concerned about all future cases and potential cases—would
not care about the disposition of the particular case at hand, because the importance of
one case pales in comparison with the great run of future cases. However, in line with the
aphorism (and longstanding lawyerly intuitions), the judge in the model cannot abstract
away from the circumstances of this case and focus only on the law that is best for all cases.
That is why the judicial payoff function contains not only the rule payoff (−|r − H|) but
also a disposition payoff (e) for getting the particular case right.
To summarize: In the single-court models that follow, the court decides a case by choosing
a rule, which generates its payoff as per equation (1).

2.2

Single Court with Perfectly Inclusive Doctrine

First consider a rule that incorporates all relevant facts (a “perfectly inclusive” rule). In
other words, there are no “special hardships” of which the law cannot take account. Then
the court’s unique optimal action would be to set the rule at its ideal point (r = H in
one dimension, the choice of the ideal separating hyperplane in higher dimensions). This
rule is the unique maximizer of the rule component of the court’s utility function, and it

10
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3964820

also guarantees the correct disposition. The choice is uniquely optimal irrespective of case
importance or case difficulty. In particular, case importance does not matter because, given
perfectly inclusive doctrine, the ideal rule always generates the correct disposition. This is
all obvious; the purpose is simply to establish a benchmark for later analyses:
Remark 1. In the single-court context, if doctrine is perfectly inclusive then cases never
make bad law.

2.3

Single Court with Under-Inclusive Doctrine

Next consider a rule that cannot reflect all relevant factual dimensions. For example, the actor’s plight in Garcia was important but could not be incorporated into copyright authorship
doctrine. There are many reasons why courts may not be able to incorporate every conceivably relevant factor into law. For example, a higher lawmaking body (e.g., the legislature)
may have cabined the factors that courts can consider. Or it might be that incorporating
additional factors would make the law too complicated to provide meaningful notice to those
who would be expected to comply with it, or would create too many loopholes for clever
actors looking for avenues of noncompliance, or would be too costly for administrability or
evidentiary reasons. Whatever the reason might be, it is common that doctrine cannot take
cognizance of all conceivably relevant facts, and that is when the maxim has bite.
In particular, suppose that perfectly inclusive doctrine would take account of facts in two
dimensions (x1 and x2 ), but it is feasible for doctrine to only consider facts in one dimension
(x1 ). To develop intuition, suppose the fact space is the unit square and the court’s ideal
perfectly inclusive rule (the “first-best rule”) is x1 = x2 , yielding ideal dispositions

dH =



1

if x1 < x2


0

if x1 ≥ x2

.

(3)

But, given under-inclusiveness, the court must choose a rule of the form r = x1 , yielding

d=



1

if x1 < r


0

if x1 > r

.
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(4)

x2
✖
✔

✔
✖

r

x1

Figure 1: The ideal rule (x1 = x2 ) takes cognizance of facts in two dimensions, but the feasible rule
r can take cognizance of facts on only one dimension (x1 ).

(To avoid epsilon problems, assume the court can choose either disposition when x1 = r.)
Clearly, then, doctrine is unavoidably imperfect: For any rule choice, some cases will not get
the disposition dictated by the first-best rule, as in the regions marked × in Figure 1.
Given that doctrine is under-inclusive and the first-best rule unfeasible, the court’s rule
utility is maximized by the “second-best rule”—i.e., the rule that would decide the largest
possible mass of cases in accordance with the first-best rule. (In Figure 1, pick r to maximize
the regions marked X. Formally, maximize Pr(d = dH ).) Simple calculus verifies that
the second-best rule is r = 1/2. The question of whether hard cases make bad law can
now be understood as whether difficult or important cases are more likely (than easy or
unimportant cases) to cause the court to deviate from its second-best rule, resulting in
unnecessary distortion away from the first-best.
First consider case importance. A case comes before the court. The court must decide
whether to choose the second-best rule or deviate from it to get the right disposition, hence
making bad law. The court would be willing to sacrifice the second-best rule if and only
if e > |x1 − 1/2|.5 That is, the court would be willing to make bad law if x1 falls in the
interval (1/2 − e, 1/2 + e), but not outside it. (Even inside this interval, a case may not pose
a rule-disposition tradeoff,6 in which case the court need not make bad law, though it would
be willing to do so if the tradeoff were posed.) So an increase in case importance increases
5
This formulation uses −|x1 −1/2| as a reduced form for the court’s rule utility (expected future disposition
utility). The expression can be microfounded by calculating expected future dispositional utility from twodimensional cases as a function of different one-dimensional rules, which shows that rule utility is indeed
single-peaked and symmetric around a maximum at r = 1/2 (though the microfounded form of the loss
function is quadratic rather than linear).
6
I.e., if x ∈ {(x1 , x2 ) | x1 ∈ (1/2 − e, 1/2) and x1 < x2 } ∪ {(x1 , x2 ) | x1 ∈ (1/2, 1/2 + e) and x1 > x2 }.
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the probability of making bad law, as shown in Figure 2.
x2

x2

x2

½
(a) e = 0

x1

½-e

½

½+e

x1

(b) e = ¼

½

x1

(c) e = ½

Figure 2: Cases making bad law (shaded regions) for three levels of case importance: (a) unimportant (e = 0), (b) moderately important (e = 1/4), (c) very important (e = 1/2).

Next consider case difficulty. This can be conceptualized as the distance between the
legally-articulable dimension of case facts and the second-best rule (|x1 − 1/2|), which captures the idea that “close” cases could go the other way if the case facts were just a little
bit different. (Keep in mind that shorter distance means greater difficulty.) It is clear from
Figure 2 (panels (b)-(c)) that difficult cases are more likely to make bad law. When the
first dimension of case facts is closer to the second-best cutpoint, (1) the probability of conflict between the first-best and second-best dispositions is higher, so the case is more likely
to pose a rule-disposition tradeoff, and (2) when such a tradeoff is posed, the court can
achieve its preferred disposition by a smaller deviation from the second-best rule; therefore,
the court is more likely to make bad law. (Formally, Pr(r 6= 1/2 | X1 = x1 ) is decreasing
∂
in |x1 − 1/2|. That is, for x1 < 1/2,
Pr(X2 < X1 | X1 = x1 ) > 0, and for x1 > 1/2,
∂x1
∂
Pr(X2 > X1 | X1 = x1 ) < 0.)
∂x1
The analysis so far has clarified three points. First, a case posing a special hardship can
make bad law, capturing the intuition in Hodgens and other cases. Second, when a case poses
a special hardship, important cases are more likely than unimportant cases to make bad law,
capturing Holmes’s intuition in Northern Securities. Third, when a case poses a special
hardship, difficult cases are more likely than easy cases to make bad law, a relationship that
13
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has not been considered before.
Formal analysis allows us to say still more. The qualitative intuition is that hard cases
make bad law, but how bad? Consider again, for any level of case importance, the region of
case facts that would make bad law. Within that region, as Figure 2 makes clear (middle and
right panels), more difficult cases actually make less-bad law. That is so because, when case
facts along the legally-articulable dimension (x1 ) are close to the second-best cutpoint, the
court can flip the disposition of the case by only a small deviation from the second-best rule.
By contrast, when case facts are far from the second-best cutpoint (easy cases), the level
of rule distortion necessary to flip the disposition is high. Conditional on making bad law,
more difficult cases make less-bad law. (There is no analogous effect for case importance;
conditional on making bad law, the degree of badness does not change in case importance.)
The insights from the single-court context can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1. When one court makes law by deciding a case,
1. Cases not posing a special hardship never make bad law.
2. Among cases that pose a special hardship, more important cases are more likely to make
bad law.
3. Among cases that pose a special hardship, more difficult cases are more likely to make
bad law.
4. Conditional on making bad law, more difficult cases make less-bad law.

2.4

Impact Litigators

The results of the previous section flow from the common law’s intertwining of courts’
dispute-settling and lawmaking functions. Another essential feature of judicial lawmaking is that courts make law by deciding cases brought to them by others. This highlights the
potential for litigators’ strategic case selection to alter the course of law. I now introduce a
game to explore this topic. My object is to show how the law may be shaped by lawyers and
activists who take interest in lawsuits not out of concern for a particular client but with an
eye to developing general law. The importance of such impact litigators (aka cause lawyers),
14
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both on the left and on the right, is widely acknowledged.7 Impact litigators have a vision of
what they want the law to be, and survey the field to select a case that is apt to realize their
vision (e.g., Hartocollis (2017)). In making this selection, they take advantage of judges’
proclivity to let the particular facts of a case influence the making of general law, so the
analysis dovetails with Section 2.3.
The players are a court (C) and an impact litigator (L). The court makes law by deciding
a case. Its decision is guided, as before, by both rule utility and disposition utility. As in
Section 2.3, the case has two factual dimensions, x1 and x2 , only the first of which can
be reflected in doctrine, as well as an importance dimension e. The impact litigator has a
role in determining which case comes before the court as the vehicle for general lawmaking.
She understands that the vehicle matters—i.e., that the resulting rule (r) might be different
depending on case characteristics (x1 , x2 , e)—and wants to select a case that would produce
a law close to her ideal rule. Of course, the litigator’s ideal rule (rL ) may be different from
the court’s (H), so the litigator is not curating cases with an eye to developing “good” law
(as the court understands that to be). Moreover, unlike the court, the litigator does not care
how a particular case comes out; all she cares about is the law that the case would make.
(This is not to say that the impact litigator would advocate against the interests of her client
in a case, which would pose problems of legal ethics. Rather, as the formal model makes
clear, the impact litigator’s strategic calculation goes to the decision of what case to take.)
Sequence of play is as follows:
1. Nature draws a case (x1 , x2 , e) according to FX1 , FX2 , FE . L decides whether or not
to bring the case. If L brings the case then C decides the case by choosing a rule r. If
L does not bring the case then the game proceeds to the second stage.
2. Nature draws a case (x1 , x2 , e) according to FX1 , FX2 , FE and C decides the case by
choosing r.
7

Prominent examples of left-leaning impact litigation include the NAACP’s efforts to end state-sanctioned
racial segregation in the South during the mid-Twentieth Century and the ACLU’s continued efforts to shape
the laws pertaining to immigration, race, and sexual orientation (see, e.g., Tushnet (1987), Epp (1998), Mack
(2012)). On the right, prominent examples include the use of litigation in tandem with other strategies to
advance the deregulatory thrust of corporate and antitrust law in the late-Twentieth Century and litigation
to roll back affirmative action (see, e.g., Teles (2008), Weinrib (2016), Hartocollis (2017)).
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Payoffs are as follows:

UC = −|r − H| + e1{d = dH }

(5)

UL = −|r − rL |

(6)

Equation (5) is the familiar judicial payoff function from Section 2.3, incorporating both rule
and disposition utility. Equation (6) captures the long horizon of impact litigators, who care
only about the rule and not about any particular disposition.8
In the model, impact litigators have a role in selecting cases, but their role is limited.
They can “take a pass” on one bad draw of a case, but they cannot hold off indefinitely until
the ideal case comes along. The idea is that the environment is rife with cases and people
want their cases heard; impact litigators can influence which case will be the one that makes
law, but they do not have a monopoly over litigation. If they pass up their opportunity for
strategic selection, a randomly selected case will determine the law.
The outcome of interest is the quality of lawmaking (or “welfare”), which is conceptualized by reference to the rule utility of the court, disregarding its disposition utility. Formally,
welfare is defined as expected equilibrium deviation from good law: W = E {−|r − H|}. As
in section 2.3, this equation takes the court’s ideal rule as the measure of “good” law. One
may think of the welfare benchmark as the payoff function of a hypothetical judge who shares
the court’s view of what law is best but does not share the court’s myopia or preoccupation
with the particular case at hand; it’s the payoff function of a philosopher king of the world
with a long horizon (which is how Justice Holmes in Northern Securities and the Lords and
Barons in Hodgens and Winterbottom appeared to think of themselves).
As before, I focus on a court with the first-best cutpoint x1 = x2 , yielding the second-best
rule H = 1/2. I assume as before that case facts are distributed uniformly over the unit
square and case importance is distributed uniformly over [0, 1/2] (recall that if e = 1/2 then
the court is always willing if necessary to sacrifice the rule to the disposition). The model in
8

Of course, a purely law-motivated litigator is an ideal type. One can conceive of purely client-motivated
and purely law-motivated lawyers more generally as endpoints of a spectrum. In this more general model,
the litigator’s payoff function takes the form UL = −|r − rL | + eL 1{d = dL }, where dL denotes L’s ideal
disposition (defined the same way as dH in equation (2)) and eL represents the weight on short-term clientcentered motivation relative to long-term impact motivation.

16
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3964820

this section can be solved for any given cumulative distribution function (with appropriate
differentiability and continuity assumptions), but the uniform distribution has the advantage
of simplicity and a clean focus on the effects of strategic case selection.
First benchmark: no impact litigator. If there is no impact litigator then the game
has only the second stage, which is equivalent to the model in Section 2.3. The court’s
optimal strategy is to pick its ideal rule (r = 1/2) whenever there is no conflict between rule
and disposition utility or the case is insufficiently important; and to distort the rule to the
minimum extent necessary to achieve its preferred disposition (r = x1 ) whenever there is a
rule-disposition conflict and the case is sufficiently important. That is,




x1
if x1 > 1/2 and x2 > x1 and e > x1 − 1/2



r = x1
if x1 < 1/2 and x2 < x1 and e > 1/2 − x1





1/2 otherwise

(7)

The resulting rule is shown in Figure 3. As Figure 3b shows, most cases make good law
but some cases make bad law. In expectation there is some distortion of the ideal rule, and
the expected magnitude of this distortion can be calculated to be 1/48.9
Second benchmark: ideal impact litigator. When the impact litigator shares the
court’s view of the ideal rule (i.e., rL = 1/2), the litigator’s payoff function is the same
as the court’s, except that the litigator is not myopic about case disposition. That is, the
litigator has the same payoff function as the hypothetical long-horizon judge whose view is
the benchmark of welfare.
Solving backwards: When a case is brought, the court decides it according to the decision
rule of equation (7). So the impact litigator’s expected payoff from moving to the second
stage is −1/48 (the same as expected welfare in the stage-two game). Accordingly, in the
first stage, the litigator brings the case drawn by Nature if and only if her expected payoff
9

Formally,
Z 0.5 Z x1 Z
W =
0

0

0.5

Z

1

Z

1

Z

0.5

x1 − 0.5dFE (e)dFX2 (x2 )dFX1 (x1 ) +

0.5−x1

0.5 − x1 dFE (e)dFX2 (x2 )dFX1 (x1 )
0.5

x1

x1 −0.5

which, given our distributional assumptions, equals −1/48.
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(a) equilibrium rule for a fixed e

(b) “bad law” regions in parameter space

Figure 3: Panel (a) shows the equilibrium rule as a function of x1 and x2 for a fixed value of e. The
filled part in panel (b) shows the regions in the entire parameter space where bad law (r 6= 1/2)
would result.

from the case exceeds −1/48. This does not mean that the litigator brings a case if and
only if |x1 − 1/2| < 1/48. Indeed the litigator brings a case if that inequality is satisfied
(i.e., if the first dimension of facts is sufficiently close to her ideal point, regardless of the
second factual dimension and case importance); but the litigator also brings a case if the
case does not pose a rule-disposition tradeoff or if it is insufficiently important to the court,
because in both those scenarios the ideal rule (r = 1/2) would result. The impact litigator’s
equilibrium strategy is specified by the following decision rule:





x1 < 23/48 and x2 < x1 and e > 1/2 − x1



L does not bring case iff or





x1 > 25/48 and x2 > x1 and e > x1 − 1/2

(8)

Under this decision rule, most configurations of case facts and case importance would
lead the litigator to bring the case, and the probability that the game ends in the first stage
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is high. This is because most cases would make the rule r = 1/2, which is the litigator’s ideal
rule and, of course, preferable to proceeding to the second stage; even among cases that would
not produce good law, some have first-dimension facts so close to the ideal rule that the rule
distortion is smaller than the expected rule distortion in stage two (i.e., |x1 − 1/2| < 1/48).
The upshot is that lawmaking quality is higher in the game with an “ideal” impact
litigator than in the model without an impact litigator. It’s easy to see why. The litigator
can take a pass on one round of litigation, and she uses this power to not bring some hard
cases that would make bad law. Because the litigator’s conception of “bad” law is the same
as the welfare benchmark, her strategic case selection improves welfare.
General case: any impact litigator. Consider, without loss of generality, an impact
litigator whose ideal rule is to the right of the court’s (rL > 1/2). Again the game is solved
backwards, and the court’s equilibrium decision rule is given by equation (7). This time,
however, the litigator’s welfare is not the same as general welfare. If the game proceeds to
the second stage, the litigator’s payoff is given by

UL2 =




x1 − r L






x 1 − r L

if x1 < 1/2 and x2 < x1 and e > 1/2 − x1
if x1 > 1/2 and x2 > x1 and e > x1 − 1/2 and rL ≥ x1




r − x1

 L



1/2 − r

L

(9)

if x1 > 1/2 and x2 > x1 and e > x1 − 1/2 and rL < x1
otherwise

Based on this, multiple integration shows that the litigator’s expected second-stage utility is
EUL2 = −

rL4
rL 1
4r3
+ L − 2rL2 +
+
3
3
3
6

(10)

(Note that this expression equals −1/48 when rL = 1/2. Note further that the impact
litigator’s expected second-stage payoff is decreasing in the distance between her ideal rule
and the court’s (∂EUL2 /∂rL < 0).)
In the first stage, the litigator brings a case if and only if her payoff from doing so is greater
than the expected second-stage payoff in equation (10). Determining when this will occur
is somewhat involved (see the Appendix), but the logic is similar to the second benchmark
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Figure 4: The probability that the impact litigator will bring a case in the first stage as a function
of the litigator’s ideal rule rL .

model analyzed above. The cases which the litigator might bring fall into two categories:
(1) cases the court would decide by making good law (r = 1/2), (2) cases the court would
decide by making bad law (r 6= 1/2, which implies r = x1 ). It turns out that all litigators
would bring any case in the first category. (That is to say, 1/2 − rL ≥ EUL2 ∀rL ∈ [1/2, 1].)
As for the second category, there is an interval of first-dimension facts around the litigator’s
ideal rule for which she litigator is willing to bring the case. The bounds of this interval,
which I denote [x1 , x1 ], move with the litigator’s ideal rule. The lower bound is always below
1/2 (equaling 1/2 when rL = 1) and the upper bound increases with rL until it reaches 1 for
sufficiently large rL (see equation (A4) and associated discussion in the Appendix).
Figure 4 shows the probability that a case will be brought in the first stage as a function
of the impact litigator’s ideal rule. The function is nonmonotonic. The probability initially
increases as the litigator’s ideal rule diverges from the court’s ideal rule, but once the divergence has become sufficiently large (roughly, for rL > 0.72), the probability declines in
ideal-rule divergence. (The probability is strictly decreasing in this region, though the rate
of decline is so low that the graph appears like a horizontal line.)
Ultimately, the analysis in this section reveals an impact litigator’s impact on welfare,
defined as expected equilibrium deviation from good law. The solid curve in Figure 5 depicts
the relationship between the litigator’s ideal rule and welfare. Not surprisingly, welfare
declines as the litigator’s ideal rule diverges from the court’s ideal rule. (The function is
strictly decreasing, though for high values of rL the rate of decline is so low that the curve
appears horizontal.) Interestingly, though, expected welfare is always higher with an impact
litigator (solid curve) than without (dashed line), even when her ideal rule is maximally far
20
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Figure 5: Expected equilibrium welfare as a function of the impact litigator’s ideal rule rL (solid
curve) and expected equilibrium welfare without an impact litigator (dashed line).

from the court’s. That is because, like the hypothetical philosopher-king judge and unlike
the actual judge in the game, the impact litigator has a long time horizon. She cares only
about the law, not about the disposition of the case that makes the law, and in serving
this long-term interest she often selects cases that do not pose a rule-disposition tradeoff
for the court. In other words, the impact litigator promotes the promulgation of good laws
by strategically selecting cases that avoid the dynamic of “hard cases make bad law.” The
benefits of such strategic case selection outweigh the “drift” costs imposed by the impact
litigator’s desire to locate the rule as close as possible to her own preferred rule.
Proposition 2 summarizes the insights from the game with an impact litigator.
Proposition 2. When the impact litigator has one pass at case selection,
1. The quality of lawmaking is higher with an impact litigator than without, regardless of
the distance between the litigator’s ideal rule and the socially ideal rule.
2. Lawmaking improves as the distance between the impact litigator’s ideal rule and the
socially ideal rule decreases.
3. The distance between the impact litigator’s ideal rule and the socially ideal rule has a
nonmonotonic effect on the probability that the litigator will select a case for litigation
at the first stage.

2.5

Impact Litigators with More Selection Power

The previous section considered an impact litigator who has one “pass” at selecting a case
before Nature selects a case for the court to decide and make law. But imagine a model
21
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where the litigator could look at more than one draw from the case space before having
to surrender case selection to Nature. In such a model the number of “passes” afforded to
the litigator captures her selection power. A natural question then is how the quality of
lawmaking changes as the litigator’s selection power increases: Do emerging laws become
monotonically worse? Are we better off without an impact litigator?
This section answers these questions. I make the previous section’s two-period model
more complex by considering an n-period model where the impact litigator can choose sequentially from n − 1 cases before Nature pushes a case to the court. On the other hand, I
simplify the model by considering one dimension instead of three. Cases are chosen randomly
from the line, and the rule of the case is assumed to be its location. So the assumption is
that Nature selects only hard cases (hence the court’s locating the rule at the case facts),
and the question is which hard case will be chosen to make the rule. In other words, all cases
(except for a measure-zero point) make bad law, and the question is the degree of badness.
The simplification both makes the calculations tractable and brings a sharper focus on the
effect of selection power. The insights from the one-dimensional model travel unambiguously
to the three-dimensional model for extremely high or low levels of selection power (n), but
the effects of selection power in the intermediate range are more cleanly graspable in the
one-dimensional model.
Sequence of play is as follows:
(1) Nature draws a case x according to FX . L decides whether or not to bring the case.
If L brings the case then C decides it by choosing r = x and the game ends. If L does
not bring the case then this case disappears and the game proceeds to the next stage.
..
.
(n − 1) Nature draws a case x according to FX . L decides whether or not to bring the case.
If L brings the case then C decides it by choosing r = x and the game ends. If L does
not bring the case then this case disappears and the game proceeds to the next stage.
(n) Nature draws a case x according to FX . C decides the case by choosing r = x and the
game ends.
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As before, X ∼ U [0, 1] and the litigator’s payoff and the welfare benchmark are
U Ln = E {−|r − rL |}
Wn = E {−|r − 1/2|}

(11)
(12)

where the subscript n denotes the expected payoff of an n-period game.
In analyzing this game it is useful to define, for an n-period game, the equilibrium
expected distance from the litigator’s ideal rule and from the welfare benchmark, which I
call Dn and DWn respectively. (So Dn = −U Ln and DWn = −Wn .) We are interested in
how these quantities change with n.
With respect to the litigator’s payoff, the intuition is straightforward: As selection power
increases, the expected distance between the equilibrium rule and the litigator’s ideal rule
decreases. What is more, the expected distance becomes arbitrarily small as the litigator’s
number of passes becomes arbitrarily large. (Formally, I show that the sequence (Dn ) is
decreasing and converges to 0.)
With respect to the welfare impact, it turns out, as in Section 2.4, that a little bit of
selection power is always preferable to no selection power: Welfare improves when we move
from a setting with no impact litigator to one with an impact litigator who has one pass at
case selection, even for the most extreme litigator. (That is, W2 ≥ W1 ∀rL .) The intuition
is that a litigator’s interest in a rule close to her own ideal rule also works against the
establishment of rules that are far from the socially optimal median rule; even litigators
with extreme preferences to one side of the optimal rule enhance social welfare by vetoing
cases that would make a rule close to the other extreme.
But does an increase in selection power continue to enhance welfare at higher levels of
selection power? And is the impact litigator’s presence always preferable to her absence,
even if she has great selection power? The answers to these questions depend in nuanced
ways on the distance between the impact litigator’s ideal rule and the socially optimal rule.
Three different regions of litigator preferences yield three different sets of answers (Figure
6). For litigators with preferences very close to the socially ideal rule (Figure 6a), having an
impact litigator with any number of passes is preferable to not having one at all. What is
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Figure 6: Expected equilibrium welfare as a function of impact litigator’s selection power (number
of periods in the game), for three different litigators: (a) litigator with preferences close to the ideal
rule (rL = 0.7), (b) litigator with preferences moderately far from the ideal rule (rL = 0.75), (c)
litigator with preferences far from the ideal rule (rL = 0.8).

more, welfare always improves as the litigator’s selection power increases. For litigators with
preferences that are intermediately close to the ideal rule (Figure 6b), it is no longer true that
increasing selection power is always beneficial; rather, increasing selection power is welfareimproving up to a point but becomes welfare-reducing after that point. However, we are still
worse off without an impact litigator than with an impact litigator with any number of passes
(even after increases in selection power have begun to erode welfare compared to lower levels
of selection power). For litigators with preferences far from the ideal rule (Figure 6c), just
as with intermediate impact litigators, increases in selection power are welfare-enhancing up
to a point and welfare-reducing afterwards. But, unlike in the previous case, for high levels
of selection power we are better off without an impact litigator.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. The impact litigator always uses her
selection power to veto cases that would make a bad rule from her perspective, bringing the
expected equilibrium rule closer to her own ideal rule. When the litigator’s ideal rule is very
close to the socially ideal rule (Figure 6a), bringing the expected equilibrium rule closer to
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her ideal rule also brings it closer to the socially ideal rule. But when the litigator’s ideal
rule is farther away from the socially ideal rule, the effects of increased selection power are
no longer unambiguously good. In the beginning, increases in selection power are beneficial
because the litigator will use her enhanced selection power to weed out extreme cases (i.e.,
cases that would make a rule far from both her ideal rule and the socially ideal rule). But,
as selection power grows, the litigator can afford to be more discriminating; in addition
to extreme cases, she begins to weed out some cases that are bad for her agenda but not
so bad for social welfare. That is why, for impact litigators with intermediate or extreme
preferences (Figure 6b - 6c), expanding selection power is welfare-improving only up to a
point. Nevertheless, if the impact litigator’s preferences are not very far from the socially
ideal rule (Figure 6b), society is always better off with such an impact litigator, even if
arbitrarily powerful, than without. By contrast, if the litigator’s preferences are very far
from the social ideal (6c), giving her ever greater selection powers can make society worse
off, even compared to a setting with no impact litigator. Society is better off with no case
curation at all than with an extremely powerful impact litigator with extreme preferences.
Proposition 3 summarizes the insights from the multiperiod impact-litigator game.
Proposition 3. In the n-period game with an impact litigator,
1. The impact litigator’s expected payoff is increasing in her selection power. Moreover,
as the impact litigator’s selection power becomes arbitrarily large, the expected rule gets
arbitrarily close to her ideal rule. Formally, Dn+1 < Dn ∀ n and (Dn ) → 0.
2. Society is better off with any impact litigator who has one pass than without an impact
litigator. Formally, W2 > W1 ∀ rL ∈ (0, 1) and W2 = W1 when rL ∈ {0, 1}.
3. When the impact litigator’s ideal rule is very close to the socially ideal rule, society is
better off with an impact litigator than without, and an increase in the litigator’s number
of passes always improves social welfare. Formally, ∃ d such that, for all rL ∈ Bd (1/2),
Wn > W1 ∀ n > 1

and

Wn+1 > Wn ∀ n.

4. When the impact litigator’s ideal rule is intermediately close to the socially ideal rule,
society is better off with an impact litigator than without; however, an increase in the
25
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litigator’s number of passes improves social welfare up to a point and reduces social
welfare after that point. Formally, for all rL such that |rL − 1/2| ∈ [d, 1/4],
(a) Wn > W1 ∀ n > 1 and
(b) ∃ n0 such that Wn+1 > Wn ∀n ≤ n0 and Wn+1 < Wn ∀n > n0
(but in the special case of |rL − 1/2| = d we have Wn0 < Wn0 +1 = Wn0 +2 = ...).
5. When the impact litigator’s ideal rule is far away from the socially ideal rule, society is
better off with an impact litigator than without iff the impact litigator has a sufficiently
small number of passes; moreover, an increase in the litigator’s number of passes improves social welfare up to a point and reduces social welfare after that point. Formally,
for all rL such that |rL − 1/2| > 1/4,
(a) ∃ n0 such that Wn+1 > Wn ∀ n ≤ n0 and Wn+1 < Wn ∀n > n0 and
(b) ∃ n00 such that Wn < W1 ∀ n ≥ n00 .

2.6

Judicial Hierarchy

The aphorism implicitly presupposes a single court making law by deciding a case, but in
fact judiciaries are hierarchically structured. In the Online Appendix I continue the theme
of investigating the impact of case characteristics on lawmaking, this time in the context of a
judicial hierarchy. The focus is on an intermediate appellate court’s review of a trial court’s
decision, where the trial court’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo but its factual
determinations are reviewed under the deferential “clear error” standard, the idea being
that trial courts are better positioned to observe facts. The model, based on Shahshahani
(2021), shows how informational asymmetry and trial courts’ factfinding discretion moderate
the influence of case characteristics on lawmaking. Briefly stated, the main results are as
follows. First, in contrast with the single-court context (Remark 1), bad law may be made
even if doctrine is perfectly inclusive and there is no special hardship. That is because the
trial court’s ability to slant the facts supplies an additional source of potential rule-disposition
conflict for the lawmaking appellate court, which may lead to rule distortion. Second, the
effect of case difficulty (closeness) on lawmaking is nonmonotonic. The cases that may make
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bad law are intermediately difficult—not the easiest cases (those with facts very far from
the appellate court’s ideal rule) nor the most difficult ones (those with facts very close to
the appellate court’s ideal rule). The intuition is that the appellate court’s rule-disposition
tradeoff is heavily weighted on side or the other in both easy and difficult cases, so the
appellate court either willingly accepts the trial court’s factfinding or shows such hostility
that it deters the trial court from certain kinds of factfinding, in both cases obviating any rule
distortion; but the rule-disposition tradeoff is finely balanced in the region of intermediate
difficulty, so there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium where rule distortion occurs with positive
probability in this region. Third, when bad law is made, the law is bad not only in the sense
of deviating from the appellate court’s ideal rule but in the stronger sense of being Paretodominated for both appellate and trial courts. In other words, there are rules that both
courts would prefer to the equilibrium rule. That is because, for the appellate court’s threat
of rule distortion to deter the trial court from fudging the facts, the threatened rule must
be farther from the trial court’s ideal rule than is the appellate court’s ideal rule (otherwise,
rule distortion would benefit rather than punish the trial court). A full analysis, including a
literature review and formal statements and proofs, may be found in the Online Appendix.

3
3.1

Implications, Applications, Extensions
Field Distortion and Justiciability

The Introduction and Section 1 gave examples of cases that fit the “hard cases” adage
and my “missing dimension” model of it. Beyond individual cases, there are entire fields
that seem susceptible to this dynamic. These are fields in which doctrinal issues often
arise in cases involving parties who are sympathetic or unsympathetic for reasons unrelated
to the central purpose of the doctrine. There is perhaps no clearer illustration of such
field distortion than the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Fourth
Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures. This protection,
held the Warren Court, embodies an “exclusionary rule” that makes evidence uncovered by
violating the Fourth Amendment inadmissible in criminal prosecutions (e.g., Mapp v. Ohio,
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367 U.S. 643 (1961)). Fourth Amendment doctrine for the past half century or more has
developed almost exclusively in the context of whether inculpatory evidence is to be excluded
from a criminal trial—with the consequence that citizens’ privacy rights have been eroded
because of judges’ natural reluctance to hold that “the criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered” (People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926) (Cardozo, J.)).
For example, the “third party doctrine” holds that a person does not have a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in information voluntarily conveyed to third parties, so the government’s accessing such information does not constitute a “search” or “seizure” triggering the
Fourth Amendment’s application. The rule was originally developed in cases where a criminal defendant had confided incriminating information to an undercover informant (e.g., On
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)). But
it would later operate to erase Fourth Amendment protection for entire categories of personal
information that citizens routinely and without much practical choice disclose to private parties (e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (a person has no Fourth Amendment
interest in his bank records); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (installation of pen
register on phone was not a “search” under Fourth Amendment)).
The trend of courts shrinking Fourth Amendment rights for fear of letting criminals off
the hook illustrates the principle that the nature of the case that makes the law matters to
what law is made. It follows that the distribution of justiciable cases in a field affects the
shape of the field. So procedural doctrines like standing that control what types of cases
the courts may hear affect what kind of law courts will make—and the effect is greater than
is commonly supposed. It is easy to see that if a particular kind of plaintiff does not have
standing to bring suit, the kinds of issues faced by that kind of plaintiff will go unredressed.
But the effect is broader than that. It’s not just that the law will not now address the issues
posed by a certain kind of case; it’s that this kind of case will not be in the mix of cases that
the court uses to make law in this field—so the court may in the end make law that addresses
this kind of case too, but it will make that law using other kinds of cases. The resulting
law may be dramatically different if justiciable and nonjusticiable cases are systematically
different along the three axes of hardness.
For example, the Supreme Court held in Clapper v. Amnesty International, 568 U.S. 398
28
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3964820

(2013), that a group of lawyers, human rights advocates, and media organizations did not
have standing to challenge the 2008 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Even though the plaintiffs had alleged that they regularly communicated with foreign persons
whom the FISA amendments, but not prior law, authorized the government to surveil (e.g.,
families of Guantánamo Bay detainees or targets of the CIA’s extraordinary renditions),
the Court held that the prospect of surveillance was too “speculative” to confer Article III
standing. Critics have pointed out that if there is no standing in this case, surveillance
could go on for a long time without its constitutionality being examined by an Article III
court. What is more (and that is the insight here), Fourth Amendment law, including
law that bears on the constitutionality of FISA amendments, will continue to be made in
other cases—cases involving accused criminals or terrorists seeking to suppress evidence of
wrongdoing, where the immediate consequences of finding a Fourth Amendment violation
will be felt far differently than when the target of the alleged violation is a human rights
advocate seeking to uncover torture or abuse, so resulting protections will be less robust.

3.2

Impact Litigators’ Impact

One of the counterintuitive results of the formal analysis is that impact litigators with modest
selection power improve lawmaking, even when their preferences are far from the ideal rule.
Bearing in mind the inherent limitations of any effort to provide an illustration for such a
result,10 a plausible example may be found in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The opinion is a milestone in landlord-tenant law (e.g., Rabin
(1984), Chused (2004)). It held that residential leases are subject to an implied warranty of
habitability and that the tenant’s obligation to pay rent depends on the landlord’s obligation
to keep the premises habitable. Much remains debatable about the reforms ushered in by
Javins and similar cases: The extension of contractually inalienable legal protections to
10

It is difficult to provide an illustration of this result, for two reasons. First, impact litigators are often
active in ideologically charged areas, so an uncontroversial example is hard to find; lefwingers tend to like
letftwing impact litigators and rightwingers the rightwing kind. Second, impact litigation becomes wellknown when it is most successful—which is to say, when the impact litigator’s influence over case selection
is large, not when it is modest. More generally, not all counterintuitive results of formal analysis lend
themselves well to nice real-world examples, especially in partial-equilibrium analysis. One of the virtues of
rigorous theory is to lay bare forces that are not empirically observable, or at least not readily so (because
their effects are masked by other forces or for some other reason).
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residential leases has been praised for protecting vulnerable tenants unable to individually
negotiate lease terms or criticized for hurting those it aims to help by resulting in higher
rents and a restricted supply of housing (Merrill and Smith (2001)). At a minimum, though,
Javins was right to recognize that a residential lease is not purely a conveyance of an interest
in land but also a contractual transaction subject to some contract law principles. So, just
as it would be inefficient to hold that a buyer whose cow has not been delivered cannot raise
that fact as a defense if sued for nonpayment and must sue separately to get his benefit
of the bargain (Nichols v. Raynbred (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 238, Hobart 88, repudiated by
Kingston v. Preston (1773) 99 Eng. Rep. 437, 2 Douglas 689), there seems little sense in
saying that the tenant must pay full rent even if the landlord has not performed his duties
under the lease. Most would presumably agree with this, even if they disagree over what
duties (if any) the law should imply into all leases.
Impact litigators played a part in bringing about the doctrinal shift in Javins. As Chused
(2004) reports, the litigation was initiated by a legal services office created with new federal
funds made available by President Johnson’s War on Poverty. The impact litigators behaved
very much as modeled: Their target was not an individual client but a change in landlordtenant law, which would inure generally to the benefit of the urban poor. They selected
a sympathetic lead plaintiff. And they underlined (then) legally irrelevant but practically
salient facts that could sway judges, going so far as to bring “bags of mouse feces, dead mice,
[and] roaches” from tenants’ apartments to the courtroom (Chused (2004) 192, 211).
What separates the impact litigators in Javins from their more famous counterparts like
the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund is the limited extent of their success. The paradigm shift
from property law to contract was incomplete and pro-tenant reform went only so far, much
to the dismay of left-leaning commentators (Merrill and Smith (2001); Kelley (1995)). This
limited success was partly due to the fact that the pro-tenant impact litigators did not have
unrivaled control over the selection of cases that made landlord-tenant law. In addition
to their systematic selection, privately directed litigation (“random case selection” in the
model) continued to shape general law (contrast the NAACP’s impact litigation over racial
segregation in education (Tushnet (1987))). For advocates of pro-tenant reform, the impact
litigators’ intervention was obviously welcome, albeit insufficiently influential. But even for
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those who do not share the impact litigators’ vision of far-reaching leftward reform, their
involvement contributed to rationalizing doctrine by importing some contract law principles
into a field dominated by arcana of real property law. From this perspective, it was good
that the impact litigators had some influence, but not too much influence, over case selection.

3.3

Hard Cases Make Good Law?

The models with under-inclusive doctrine assume that some inherent limitation makes doctrine incapable of reflecting certain kinds of case facts. The limitation’s existence is important to the models (though its source is not). It implies that cases raising salient but
extra-doctrinal factual issues create distractions that might divert judges from the path of
true law. But imagine instead that cases with salient extra-doctrinal facts point up important issues that doctrine should but currently does not address. Then the doctrinal
variations caused by cases posing a special hardship are not always distortions; they might
be appropriate concessions to previously unheeded realities.
Consider Winterbottom in this light. A modern reader is not likely to commend the court
for sticking to the privity-of-contract rule in spite of the coach driver’s misfortune; to the
contrary, the case shows the silliness of the rule. Indeed that is how courts eventually came
to view the matter (e.g., MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382 (1916) (Cardozo, J.); Donoghue
v. Stevenson (1932) UKHL 100; see also Shadmehr, Cameron and Shahshahani (2022 forthcoming)). A plausible interpretation is that confrontation with doctrinally unaccounted-for
facts in cases like Winterbottom served in time to alert common law judges to the shortcomings of existing doctrine, causing them to revise outdated laws. In this interpretation, hard
cases make good law by forcing the consideration of important unconsidered issues.
Of course, it is neither realistic nor theoretically interesting to conceptualize hard cases
as having only this enlightening quality. A more promising approach would be to recognize
that hard cases can distract judges from good lawmaking or teach judges something about
the world. And instead of assuming that the dimensionality of doctrine is inherently limited,
one can assume that expanding the dimensionality comes at a cost. The desirability of
expansion would then depend on the distribution of case facts along the accounted- and
unaccounted-for dimensions. In such a learning model, courts first update their priors about
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the distribution of global case facts by seeing new cases, and then make law. An impact
litigator may help the court by providing accurate information about the distribution of
case facts or mislead the court in order to locate the rule closer to her own ideal point, so
the court may not update or may update skeptically. The strategic issues raised by such
a setting are common to many signaling models (see Milgrom (2008) and Sobel (2009) for
surveys). The extension can be profitably pursued in future work.

3.4

Equity Preserves Law

The model provokes us to see equity in a new light. The traditional justification for equitable
doctrines is to prevent injustice and harshness to a party resulting from the strict application
of law. That is how Roscoe Pound saw it when he spoke of equity as “a needed safety valve
in the working of our legal system” (Pound (1922)). Smith (2012) offers a similar vision in
his “reconstruction of the traditional approach to equity,” which sees equity as frustrating
sophisticated parties’ “opportunism” in taking unfair advantage of the rigid structures of
common law, a vision formalized in Ayotte, Friedman and Smith (2013).
The present analysis offers a different justification—to preserve sound law. In this view,
equity affords an outlet to a court who would otherwise distort the law in order to achieve
justice or fairness in a hard case. So the prime virtue of equity is not to save a particular
party from injustice but to save many potential future parties (society at large) from the
court’s bending the law to save that party from injustice.
For example, consider laches—the equitable doctrine which holds that a claimant who
waits unreasonably long before bringing suit is time-barred even if technically within the
statute of limitations. The traditional view would say that laches protects the sympathetic
defendant who has made decisions in reliance on the reasonable expectation that the claimant
will not sue. The “hard cases” view would say that laches protects us all from the court’s
protecting the sympathetic defendant and denying relief to the claimant by distorting the
applicable substantive or procedural law (e.g., the definition of when a claim accrues).
The difference in viewpoints comes down to a difference in assumptions about what the
court would do in the absence of an equitable escape hatch. The traditional view assumes a
farsighted court who would let the party in suit suffer a hardship rather than alter generally
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sound law. The present view, by contrast, allows that the court might be myopic and swayed
by the party’s plight to distort the law. Of course we don’t know the precise distribution
of farsighted and myopic judges, but the alternative view has purchase to the extent that
“hard cases make bad law” has purchase.
Note well that for this view to hold water, equity must be relatively soft; it cannot
be too law-like. If an equitable doctrine has definite preconditions for application, then
there is no meaningful difference (analytically, in terms of the model) between equity and
law. Sometimes the law is initially harsh and subsequently evolves to incorporate equitable
considerations; but such situations are more usefully conceptualized in the dynamic terms
of Section 3.3. By contrast, the idea of equity elaborated in this section is that the law
cannot systematically incorporate certain considerations, so it allows for an external escape
valve to keep doctrine pure. In this view, then, the lawlessness of equity is not a bug but an
essential feature of its law-preserving function. The famous “Chancellor’s foot” critique of
equity (Selden (1689))11 should be reinterpreted as praise.
This is not to say that equity is necessarily superior. The benefits of flexibility must
be weighed against the costs of misapplication—both unintentional (because the boundaries
of doctrine are unclear) and strategic (e.g., by a lower court with outlying preferences).
This may be viewed as one manifestation of a fundamental tradeoff in principal-agent theory
(e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Epstein and O’Halloran (1994), Aghion and Tirole (1997),
Dessein (2002)). All the same, the point here is that the “safety valve” function of equity
is not simply to attain justice in particular cases but, perhaps more importantly, to prevent
the law from being distorted in order to attain justice in particular cases.

4

Conclusion

Through a series of formal models built around the maxim that hard cases make bad law,
this paper sheds light on two fundamental features of the common law process. First, gen11

“Equity is a roguish thing: for law we have a measure, know what to trust to; equity is according to the
conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis all one as if they
should make the standard for the measure we call a foot, a Chancellor’s foot; what an uncertain measure
would this be? One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot: ‘tis the
same thing in a Chancellor’s conscience.”
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eral laws are made by particular cases, so the vagaries of a few cases may matter a great
deal beyond those cases. Second, strategic case selection by litigators attentive to judges’
amenability to the influence of extra-doctrinal considerations can affect doctrine. The models capture the core qualitative intuition that a special hardship tempts courts to distort
law. They also sharpen and enrich that intuition by considering how three different senses
of “hard”—doctrinal under-inclusiveness (special hardship), case importance, and case difficulty (closeness)—interact to affect lawmaking. Cases posing a special hardship may make
bad law, and they are more likely to do so when the case is important or close. Beyond the
context assumed in the aphorism, the paper takes up impact litigators and judicial hierarchy.
Surprisingly, impact litigators have a positive impact on lawmaking even when their preferences are maximally far from the social ideal—as long as their power over case selection is
modest. Their impact is more nuanced when their selection power is enhanced; the analysis
identifies three distinct regimes depending on litigator preferences. In a judicial hierarchy
with asymmetric information and factfinding discretion, even cases that do not pose a special hardship may make bad law. Moreover, the cases that make bad law are intermediately
difficult—not the hardest cases but not the easiest cases either. And bad laws are bad in
the strong sense of being Pareto-dominated.
Future work can build on the present analysis by incorporating dynamic learning effects
that allow hard cases to exert a positive as well as negative influence on law development
(see §3.3). It can also explore judicial techniques for limiting the distortionary effects of
hard cases, including: disposing of a case by unpublished opinion, distinguishing troublesome precedent by limiting it to its facts or introducing dubious distinctions, and, in the
case of most apex courts, case selection through a discretionary docket. These tactics soften
the rule-disposition tradeoff by avoiding the imperative that ensuring the just disposition of
a particular case must come at the expense of distorting the law. But they come at substantial cost. For example, repeated use of nonprecedential opinions diminishes confidence
in the courts, and introducing dubious distinctions intro doctrine avoids one distortion only
by introducing another. The present models may also be extended by adding a new fact
dimension to the judicial hierarchy game or introducing competition between impact litigators with divergent preferences. Finally, the question of how the particular instantiation of
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a policy problem influences the general solution to that problem may be explored in nonjudicial settings such as administrative and legislative lawmaking. For example, the War
Powers Act attempted in response to particular abuses by President Nixon to rework the
general balance of congressional-executive authority in warmaking. More recently, gun control legislation has been tailored to mass shootings in schools, but more pervasive problems
of gun violence have not inspired legislation. The idea that the particular might influence
the general, and that the influence might be distortionary, is thus endemic in the politics of
policymaking. Of course, there are important differences between judicial and nonjudicial
lawmaking. Deeper understanding of the judicial setting can help us see how far the idea
travels in other settings.

Appendix: Formal Statements and Proofs
Section 2.3. The proofs are straightforward and follow the main text.
Section 2.4.
First I solve backward to characterize the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the
game. Then I prove the statements in Proposition 2, which are properties of the equilibrium.
Without loss of generality, assume rL ≥ 1/2; the proof for rL < 1/2 is symmetric.
When a case is brought (in the first or second stage), C’s optimal decision rule is




x1
if x1 > 1/2 and x2 > x1 and e > x1 − 1/2



r = x1
if x1 < 1/2 and x2 < x1 and e > 1/2 − x1





1/2 otherwise

(A1)

So L’s payoff from bringing a case is

UL2 =




x1 − rL






x1 − rL



rL − x1





1/2 − r

if x1 < 1/2 and x2 < x1 and e > 1/2 − x1
if x1 > 1/2 and x2 > x1 and e > x1 − 1/2 and rL ≥ x1
if x1 > 1/2 and x2 > x1 and e > x1 − 1/2 and rL < x1
L

otherwise
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(A2)

By (A2), LC’s expected utility from not bringing case and proceeding to the second stage is
UL2

Z

0.5

Z

0.5

x1

Z

Z

rL

Z

0.5

Z

1

x1 − rL dFX2 (x2 )dFE (e)dFX1 (x1 )

x1 − rL dFX2 (x2 )dFE (e)dFX1 (x1 ) +

=
0
Z 1

Z

0.5−x1 0
Z 1
0.5

0.5

x1 −0.5

x1

rL − x1 dFX2 (x2 )dFE (e)dFX1 (x1 ) + (5/6)(0.5 − rL )

+
x1 −0.5 x1
rL4
4rL3

rL

=−

3

+

3

− 2rL2 +

rL 1
+ .
3
6
(A3)

At the first stage, L brings case iff UL1 ≥ UL2 . There are two ways this can happen: (1)
−|x1 − rL | ≥ UL2 (i.e., when the case makes bad law), (2) −|1/2 − rL | ≥ UL2 (i.e., when the
case makes good law). Inequality (2) is satisfied for all rL ≥ 1/2, so L always brings a case
that would make good law. For inequality (2), we must find the largest interval [x1 , x1 ] such
4rL 1
4r3
r4
that x1 ∈ [x1 , x1 ] =⇒ −|x1 − rL | ≥ UL2 . This yields x1 = − L + L − 2rL2 +
+ and
3
3
3
6
rL4 4rL3
2r
1
L
x1 =
−
+ 2rL2 +
− . It turns out that x1 < 1/2 ∀rL ∈ (1/2, 1) (and x1 = 1/2 for
3
3
3
6
rL = 1). Setting x1 = 1 and solving for rL yields an irrational number slightly smaller than
0.75, which we denote rL . Putting all this together, L’s equilibrium strategy is given by the
following decision rule:




x1 < x1 and x2 < x1 and e > 1/2 − x1



L does not bring case iff or





x1 > x1 and x2 > x1 and e > x1 − 1/2
 4
rL 4rL3
2rL 1


4
3
−
+ 2rL2 +
−
rL 4rL
4r
1
L
3
3
3
6
−2rL2 +
+ and x1 =
where x1 = − +

3
3
3 6
1

(A4)

if rL ≤ rL

if rL > rL
∼
and rL is the value of rL (an irrational number) that solves x1 (rL ) = 1 (rL = 0.749342). Together, equations (A1) and (A4) characterize the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
strategy profile of the game in this section. We are now in a position to prove Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. By (A1), expected welfare in the game without an impact
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litigator is
0.5

Z

Z

x1

Z

0.5

Z

1

Z

1

Z

0.5

0.5 − x1 dFE (e)dFX2 (x2 )dFX1 (x1 ) = −1/48.

x1 − 0.5dFE (e)dFX2 (x2 )dFX1 (x1 ) +

W1 =
0

0

0.5−x1

0.5

x1

x1 −0.5

(A5)

Based on (A1), (A4), and (A5), welfare in the game with an impact litigator is given by

W2 =




x1 − 1/2





1/2 − x1



−1/48





0

if x1 ∈ (x1 , 1/2) and x2 < x1 and e > 1/2 − x1
if x1 ∈ (1/2, x1 ) and x2 > x1 and e > x1 − 1/2

(A6)

if L does not bring case in the first stage
otherwise

Based on (A6), expected welfare in the game with an impact litigator is calculated by
integration to be
W2 =


1
4 3
3
2
4 4
3
2
) (if rL ≥ rL )
+ 2rL
− 8rL
) − 23(−1 − 8rL + 12rL
− 2rL
+ 8rL
−324 − 6(1 + 8rL − 12rL
15552

and
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
(−1706 + 4941rL + 9822rL
− 39748rL
− 6045rL
+ 134244rL
− 175848rL
+ 116976rL
− 125136rL
+
3888
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
205940rL
− 230904rL
+ 165840rL
− 79964rL
+ 26304rL
− 5760rL
+ 768rL
− 48rL
) (if rL < rL ).
W2 =

Using these expressions for W2 , one can verify that W2 (rL ) > W1 ∀rL ∈ [1/2, 1] (see also
Figure 5).
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Using the same expressions for W2 , one can verify that
∂W2 /∂rL < 0 ∀rL ∈ [1/2, 1].
Proof of Proposition 2.3. By (A4), the probability that L will not bring case in the
first round (P ) is calculated to be

P =


−1

3


(−1 − 8rL + 12rL2 − 8rL3 + 2rL4 )


324


if rL ≥ rL






 1 ((1 + 8rL − 12rL2 + 8rL3 − 2rL4 )3 − (−7 + 4rL + 12rL2 − 8rL3 + 2rL4 )3 )
324

if rL < rL
(A7)

One can verify that the equation ∂P/∂rL = 0 has a unique solution in the interval
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rL ∈ [1/2, 1] (denoted r̃, with r̃ ∼
= 0.718337), with ∂P/∂rL < 0 for rL < r̃ and ∂P/∂rL > 0
for rL < r̃ (see also Figure 4).
Section 2.5.
Without loss of generality, assume rL ≥ 1/2. The proofs for rL < 1/2 are symmetric. To
avoid proliferation of subscripts, I abuse notation and use r instead of rL for L’s ideal rule.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. To begin note that
D1 = E(|r − X|) = E(r − X|X < r) Pr(X < r) + E(X − r|X > r) Pr(X > r) = r2 − r + 1/2.
Moreover, Dn+1 = E{|X − r| X ∈ BDn (r)} Pr(X ∈ BDn (r)) + Dn (1 − Pr(X ∈ BDn (r))). So
(Dn ) is decreasing. It is easy to verify that r − D1 < 1/2 ∀ r < 1. There are two cases to
√
√
consider: (1) r + D1 ≤ 1 and (2) r + D1 > 1, which is to say (1) r ≤ 1/ 2 and (2) r > 1/ 2.
For case (1), note that Dn+1 = Dn (1 − Dn ). To see that (Dn ) → 0, suppose for contradiction
that (Dn ) does not converge to 0. Then, given that (Dn ) is bounded below by 0, there exists
 ∈ (0, 1) such that Dn >  ∀ n. Now Dn >  =⇒ 1 − Dn < 1 − , so for all n we have
Dn+1 = Dn (1 − Dn ) < Dn (1 − ) < Dn−1 (1 − )2 < ... < D1 (1 − )n . But lim D1 (1 − )n = 0,
n→∞

which implies that (Dn ) → 0, a contradiction.
For case (2), if r = 1 then
Dn+1 = E(1 − X|X > 1 − Dn ) Pr(X > 1 − Dn ) + Dn Pr(X < 1 − Dn ) = Dn (1 − Dn /2), and
it follows by the same argument as in case (1) that the sequence converges to 0.
√
Finally consider the case r ∈ (1/ 2, 1). As before,
Dn+1 = E{|X − r| X ∈ BDn (r)} Pr(X ∈ BDn (r)) + Dn (1 − Pr(X ∈ BDn (r))), so (Dn ) is
decreasing. Now either there exists n such that r + Dn < 1 ∀n ≥ n or there does not exist
such n. If such n exists then for all n ≥ n the sequence takes the form Dn+1 = Dn (1 − Dn ),
and (Dn ) → 0 by the same argument as in case (1). If such n does not exist (which implies
that (Dn ) does not converge to 0) then for all n we have
Dn+1 = E(X −r|X ∈ (r, 1)) Pr(X ∈ (r, 1))+E(r −X|X ∈ (r −Dn , r)) Pr(X ∈ (r −Dn , r))+
(1 − r)2
Dn
Dn Pr(X < r − Dn ) =
+ Dn (r −
). Now recall the sequence we obtained when
2
2
0
r = 1 and call that sequence (Dn0 ) (with Dn+1
= Dn0 (1 − Dn0 /2)). Note that D10 > D1 = r2 −
r + 1/2 ∀ r < 1, and note that one can verify (using the assumption that r + Dn > 1 ∀ n) that
0
if there exists some n such that Dn0 > Dn then Dn+1
> Dn+1 . It follows that Dn < Dn0 ∀ n,

which implies, because (Dn0 ) → 0, that (Dn ) → 0, proving our claim and contradicting the
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assumption that the hypothesized n does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Recall that D1 = r2 − r + 1/2. Accordingly DW1 = 1/4.
Now DW2 = E(|X − 1/2| X ∈ BD1 (r)) Pr(X ∈ BD1 (r)) + (1/4)(1 − Pr(X ∈ BD1 (r))).
Note that E(|X − 1/2| X ∈ BD1 (r)) < 1/4 ∀ r < 1 (and E(.) = 1/4 for r = 1), so
DW2 < DW1 ∀ r < 1 (and DW2 = DW1 for r = 1).
Proof of Propositions 3.3-3.5. We begin with a useful lemma.
Lemma 1. For any n such that BDn (r) ∈ [1/2, 1],
DWn > DWn+1 > DWn+2 > ... if DWn > r − 1/2 and
DWn < DWn+1 < DWn+2 < ... if DWn < r − 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that DW1 = 1/4 and, for all n,
DWn+1 = E{|X − 1/2| X ∈ BDn (r)} Pr(X ∈ BDn (r)) + DWn (1 − Pr(X ∈ BDn (r))). Now if
BDn (r) ∈ [1/2, 1] (which also implies by the decreasingness of (Dn ) that BDn+1 (r) ∈ [1/2, 1])
then we obtain DWn+1 = (r − 1/2)2Dn + DWn (1 − 2Dn ). Because DWn+1 is a convex
combination of r − 1/2 and DWn , it follows that DWn+1 > DWn if DWn < r − 1/2 and
DWn+1 < DWn if DWn > r − 1/2.

√
√
Now consider three cases separately: (1) r ∈ (1/2, 1/ 2), (2) r > 3/4, (3) r ∈ [1/ 2, 3/4].
√
Case 1 (r < 1/ 2): In this case BDn (r) ∈ (0, 1) ∀ n, so

DWn+1 = E{|X − 1/2| X ∈ BDn (r)}2Dn + DWn (1 − 2Dn ). Now for all n such that
r − Dn < 1/2, we know that E{|X − 1/2| X ∈ BDn (r)} is increasing in Dn and therefore
decreasing in n. So for all n such that r − Dn−1 < 1/2, we have DW1 > DW2 > ... > DWn .
Note moreover that, for all n such that r − Dn < 1/2 and BDn (r) ∈ (0, 1), we have
E{|X − 1/2| X ∈ BDn (r)} > r − 1/2. Now let n0 be the first n such that BDn (r) ∈ [1/2, 1].
Because E{|X −1/2| X ∈ BDn0 −1 (r)} > r −1/2 and DWn0 −1 > E{|X −1/2| X ∈ BDn0 −1 (r)},
it follows that DWn0 > r − 1/2 and
DWn0 +1 = (r − 1/2)2Dn0 + DWn0 (1 − 2Dn0 ) ∈ (r − 1/2, DWn0 ). Therefore, by Lemma 1,
DWn0 +1 > DWn0 +2 > ... We have shown (DWn ) is decreasing, which proves Proposition 3.3.
Case 2 (r > 3/4): Let n0 be the first n such that r − Dn ≥ 1/2. Then
r − 1/2 > 1/4 = DW1 > DW2 > ... > DWn0 =
0
0
0
E{|X − 1/2| X ∈ BDn−1
(r)} Pr(X ∈ BDn−1
(r)) + DWn0 −1 (1 − Pr(X ∈ BDn−1
(r)). Now
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DW
 n0 +1 =

E{X − 1/2|X ∈ (r − Dn0 , 1)} Pr(X ∈ (r − Dn0 , 1)) + DWn0 (1 − Pr(X ∈ (r − Dn0 , 1))

(r − 1/2)2Dn0 + DWn0 (1 − 2Dn0 )
which, in either case, yields DWn0 +1 > DWn0 .

if r + Dn0 ≥ 1
if r + Dn0 < 1

As for DWn0 +2 : If r + Dn0 ≤ 1 then r + Dn+1 < 1 ∀ n ≥ n0 and, because DWn0 +1 < r − 1/2,
it follows by Lemma 1 that DWn0 +1 < DWn0 +2 < ... If r + Dn0 > 1: If r + Dn0 +1 ≤ 1 then,
by the same argument as above, DWn0 +1 < DWn0 +2 < ...; if r + Dn0 +1 > 1 then DWn0 +2 =
E{X − 1/2 X ∈ (r − Dn0 +1 , 1)} Pr(X ∈ (r − Dn0 +1 , 1)) + DWn0 +1 (1 − Pr(X ∈ (r − Dn0 +1 , 1))) > DWn0 +1
where the inequality follows from the fact that
E{X − 1/2 X ∈ (r − Dn0 +1 , 1)} > E{X − 1/2 X ∈ (r − Dn0 , 1)} > DWn0 +1 . So we have
DWn0 +1 < DWn0 +2 and, repeating the same argument, we obtain DWn0 +2 < DWn0 +3 < ...
We have shown that, for all r > 3/4, there exists n0 such that DW1 > DW2 > ... > DWn0
and DWn0 < DWn0 +1 < ... Finally note that (Dn ) → 0 =⇒ (DWn ) → r − 1/2 > DW1 ,
which concludes the proof of Proposition 3.5.
√
Case 3 (r ∈ [1/ 2, 3/4]): Let n0 be the first n such that r − Dn ≥ 1/2 and note, for all
√
r ∈ [1/ 2, 3/4]), that r − Dn ≥ 1/2 =⇒ r + Dn ≤ 1. We know that
1/4 = DW1 > ... > DWn0 = E{|X − 1/2| X ∈ BDn0 −1 (r)} Pr(X ∈ BDn0 −1 (r)) + DWn0 −1 (1 − P r(.)).
√
√
Indeed, it turns out that n0 = 2 ∀ r ∈ [1/ 2, 3/4] (and that r − D2 = 1/2 for r = 1/ 2).
So DWn0 +1 = DW3 = (r − 1/2)2D2 + DW2 (1 − 2D2 ). One can calculate that
(1/2 − r + D1 )2
1
r − D1
DW2 =
+ +
, and DW2 < r − 1/2 ⇐⇒ r > r where
2
8
4
√
r ∈ (1/ 2, 
3/4) is an irrational number (r ≈ 0.7349).
√



DW1 > DW2 > ...
for r ∈ [1/ 2, r)



Therefore, DW1 > DW2 and DW2 < DW3 < ...
for r ∈ (r, 3/4]





DW1 > DW2 = DW3 = ...
for r = r
√
Note that r ∈ [1/ 2, r) fall in Proposition 3.3 and r ∈ [r, 3/4] fall in Proposition 3.4. This
concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
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Online Appendix: Judicial Hierarchy
The aphorism implicitly presupposes a single court making law by deciding a case, but in
fact judiciaries are hierarchically structured. The literature on strategic interaction in the
judicial hierarchy is vast (see Kastellec (2017) for a review). Going back to the seminal
work of Cameron, Segal and Songer (2000), most of this literature focuses on auditing—
that is, whether the higher court will review the lower court’s decision. For example, Lax
(2003) studies the impact of the “rule of four” on Supreme Court certiorari decisions; Beim,
Hirsch and Kastellec (2014) examine how “whistle blowing” by a judge or a nonjudicial
actor can help higher courts induce lower courts’ compliance; and Badawi and Baker (2015)
investigate an appellate court’s investments in developing precedent in the context of auditing
trial courts. The auditing framework is appropriate for studying a supreme court’s review
of appellate court decisions (as well as en banc review in federal circuit courts), where
the decision whether to hear an appeal is discretionary, but not so much for intermediate
appellate courts’ review of trial court decisions, where the appellate court is required to
hear all appeals. This section focuses on the latter (more common) level of hierarchical
interaction.
A salient feature of this setting is that trial courts are better positioned to observe case
facts, and appellate courts defer to trial courts’ factual determinations under the “clear
error” standard of review. Unlike trial courts’ legal determinations, which can be overturned
whenever the appellate court finds them to be wrong, trial courts’ factual determinations
cannot be overturned unless they are clearly wrong (see Shahshahani (2021), 441, for fuller
exposition). The goal of this section is to understand how informational asymmetry and
trial courts’ fact discretion, enshrined in the clear-error standard, moderate the influence of
case characteristics on lawmaking.

Model
The model is based on Shahshahani (2021). The players are a higher court HC, with ideal
rule H, and a lower court LC, with ideal rule L. Ideal rules are common knowledge. The fact
space is one-dimensional and doctrine is perfectly inclusive. Sequence of play is as follows:
OA1
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1. Nature selects the true case facts (xt ∈ R) and a signal of case facts (x ∈ R). LC
observes both xt and x, but HC observes only x. From HC’s perspective, true case
facts are uniformly distributed on an epsilon ball around the signal:
(Xt | X = x) ∼ U [x − , x + ] ∀x.
2. LC decides what facts to report, x0 , where x0 ∈ [x − , x + ].

3. HC announces the rule r, which determines the disposition as follows: d =



1 if x0 < r

0 if x0 > r

If r = x0 then HC can choose either disposition.
Payoffs are:
UHC = −|r − H| + eh 1{d = dH }

(OA1)

ULC = −|r − L| + e` 1{d = dL }

(OA2)

where dL and dH are the courts’ ideal dispositions, as in equation (2).
A strategy for LC is the choice of facts to report in light of the public signal and the

true facts σLC : R × [x − , x + ] → [x − , x + ] . A strategy for HC is the choice of a

rule in light of the public signal and LC’s reported facts σHC : R × [x − , x + ] → R . The
solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Without loss of generality, assume L > H
and H = 0.

Analysis
Judicial preferences in this model are like the single-court models: Courts are interested both
in getting the right disposition in this case and in making the right rule to govern future
cases (though the two courts don’t have the same view of what constitutes the “right” rule
and disposition). However, the informational environment is different from the single-court
context in that the trial court knows more about case facts than the appellate court. The
appellate court knows the neighborhood of true case facts whereas the trial court knows the
precise location. (Of course, xt need not be the literal truth; it can be a best estimate.) The
parameter  indexes the radius of the neighborhood. A larger  denotes a more fact-intensive
OA2
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.

case, such that the public signal conveys only a general indication of where the true facts
are and the trial court’s factfinding discretion is concomitantly greater.
The model gives content to the deferential clear-error standard of review by assuming
that as long as the trial court’s reported facts are within the epsilon neighborhood where
the truth could be (x0 ∈ [x − , x + ]), they are not clearly erroneous and must be accepted
by the appellate court.1 So the appellate court’s rule generates a disposition by reference to
the case facts reported by the trial court (x0 ), not the public signal (nor the true facts).
The source of strategic tension in the model is the trial court’s use of its factfinding
discretion to obtain its preferred disposition. In particular, when the two courts’ ideal
dispositions conflict, the trial court is tempted to slant the facts to get the disposition it
wants. On the other hand, the appellate court understands this strategic incentive, so it may
not believe the facts reported by the trial court. And even though it cannot directly override
those facts (because of the clear-error standard of review), it can distort the rule to change
the disposition. So, as in Section 2.3, the appellate court faces a rule-disposition tradeoff, but
the source of the tradeoff is different and it exists even when doctrine is perfectly inclusive.
Moreover, the appellate court’s Bayesian assessment of the trial court’s factfinding is
complicated by the dual nature of such factfinding. When the trial court reports facts other
than the public signal (x0 6= x), it may be misrepresenting the true facts; on the other hand,
it may be attempting to correct the mistaken impression of true facts created by the signal
(see Figure OA1). It is useful to distinguish these two varieties of factfinding. “Helpful
factfinding” occurs when the trial court uses its factfinding power to report facts that are on
the same side of the appellate court’s ideal point as the true facts; “deceptive factfinding”
occurs when the trial court uses its factfinding power to report facts that are on the opposite
side of the appellate court’s ideal point as the true facts. Formally, helpful factfinding means
x0 6= x and sign{x0 } = sign{xt }; deceptive factfinding means x0 6= x and sign{x0 } =
6 sign{xt }.
With a sense of the strategic forces at play, we are now in a position to discuss the
model’s equilibrium. The first important result is that very easy cases never make bad law.
1

In the model the trial court is restricted to finding facts within an epsilon neighborhood of the public
signal. One can construct a more complicated model where the trial court can report facts anywhere but
reported facts outside the epsilon neighborhood are clearly erroneous and reversible. But this would reduce
to essentially the same model because reporting clearly erroneous facts would be dominated.

OA3
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Figure OA1: HC sees the signal (x) and LC’s factual report (x0 ), but not the true facts (xt ), so
it does not know whether LC’s factfinding is helpful or deceptive. If xt < 0 (as in x2t ) then the
factfinding is helpful; but if xt > 0 (as in x1t ) then the factfinding is deceptive.

If the public signal is very far from the appellate court’s ideal rule (i.e., if x >  or x < −),
then the appellate court, though uncertain about the precise location of case facts, knows
all that it needs to know. If the public signal is very far to the left then the appellate court
knows that the true facts are also to the left of its ideal point (x < − =⇒ xt < 0), so its
ideal disposition is 1. By the same token, if the public signal is very far to the right then its
ideal disposition is 0. Moreover, when the public signal is so extreme, the trial court cannot
move the operative facts from one side of the appellate court’s ideal rule to the other (i.e.,
sign{x} = sign{x0 }). Therefore, for extreme public signals (very easy cases), setting the rule
at its ideal point is the unique maximizer of the appellate court’s payoff function—regardless
of the facts reported by the trial court.2
Remark 2. In the judicial-hierarchy game with perfectly inclusive doctrine, very easy cases
never make bad law. Formally, x ∈
/ [−, ] =⇒ r = 0.
Note well the generality of this result. Remark 2 does not pertain to a specific equilibrium
of the game; rather, it says there exists no equilibrium in which very easy cases ever make
bad law. It turns out that similarly general results cannot be stated about case importance.
But considering an equilibrium of the game where bad lawmaking can happen shows how
judicial hierarchy complicates the analysis from a single-court model.
Figure OA2 portrays the equilibrium outcomes of factfinding and rulemaking as a function of the public signal (see Proposition 5 for a full characterization of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium). To understand the salient features of this equilibrium, it is useful to consider
different realizations of the public signal in turn. For extreme realizations of the public signal
(x ∈
/ (−, )), HC always sets the rule at its ideal point (see Remark 2).
Next consider the region x ∈ (0, ). It is useful to consider what would happen if HC were
to always set its ideal rule (r = 0). Then, if xt > L then LC would not have an incentive
2

The foregoing, and the discussion of equilibrium to follow, take the location of x to be the measure of
difficulty. Given the distribution of Xt | X, similar results would obtain if xt were taken to be the measure.
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x w/ positive probability
x' =

= x if xt < L
x'

x' = x
r=0

> 0 if xt > L

x if xt > L
x' =

r=0

x - ε if xt < L

x - ε w/ positive probability

If x' = x then r = 0
If x' = x – ε then r =

x' = x
r=0

0 w/ positive probability
x - ε w/ positive probability

r=0

-ε

0

x*

Figure OA2: Equilibrium outcomes of factfinding and rulemaking as a function of the public signal
in the judicial-hierarchy game with perfectly inclusive doctrine. Cases make bad law with positive
probability when x ∈ (x∗ , ).

to report facts other than the public signal because it could get its preferred disposition
under the public signal. However, if xt < L then LC would set x0 < 0 to get its preferred
disposition, which it could not get without such a fact report. Now consider whether HC
would keep the rule at r = 0 in response. As discussed in connection with Figure OA1,
HC’s decision is complicated by the fact that it does not know whether LC’s factfinding is
helpful or deceptive. If LC’s factfinding is helpful then HC is better off keeping the rule at 0
because that would produce both its preferred rule and its preferred disposition. But if LC’s
factfinding is deceptive then HC might be better off setting r = x0 in order to reverse the
dispositional effect of the factfinding and prevent the loss of dispositional utility—provided,
however, that the gain in dispositional utility is worth the cost in rule utility that would be
borne by setting r = x0 . (Note that HC would never distort the rule away from its ideal
point more than the minimum extent necessary to reverse the dispositional effect of LC’s
factfinding. So, when x0 < 0, HC would never set r < x0 .) Ultimately, then, HC’s response
to LC’s reporting facts x0 < 0 depends on two considerations: (1) HC’s posterior belief that
LC’s factfinding is deceptive, and (2) the amount of rule utility that HC would have to
sacrifice to guard against the probable loss of dispositional utility. For values of x close to 0,
both considerations lead HC toward keeping the rule at its ideal point; for values of x close
to , by contrast, both considerations pull HC toward choosing r = x0 in response to x0 < 0.
These dynamics lead to an equilibrium with a threshold structure. The threshold x∗ in
the interval (0, ) specifies the value of x at which, provided LC sets x0 as far to the left of
0 as possible (which is in its interest to do), HC’s expected utilities from r = 0 and r = x0
are equal. HC would “tolerate” LC’s factfinding where the public signal is below x∗ but not
OA5
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ε

x

above x∗ —meaning that if x > x∗ and x0 < 0 then HC would set r = x0 to counteract the
factfinding. (See Proposition 5 for the closed form of x∗ .)
LC’s factfinding in turn depends on HC’s anticipated response. Below x∗ , HC would
tolerate fact reports far to the left of 0, so LC reports facts other than the public signal if
and only if doing so would be necessary to obtain its preferred disposition (i.e., if xt > L then
x0 = x, and if xt < L then x0 = x − ). Above x∗ , as discussed, HC would not tolerate LC’s
strategy of engaging in factfinding whenever necessary to obtain LC’s preferred disposition.
Rather, in equilibrium, LC sometimes engages in factfinding and HC sometimes tolerates it.
The key to sustaining this strategy profile in equilibrium is that LC is more likely to engage
in helpful than deceptive factfinding. (That is, Pr(x0 < 0|xt < 0) > Pr(x0 < 0|xt ≥ 0). The
precise relationship between the probabilities is stated in Proposition 5.) In the absence of
this relationship between the probabilities of helpful and deceptive factfinding, HC would
never tolerate factfinding above x∗ . As it is, HC sometimes tolerates LC’s factfinding (r = 0)
and sometimes does not (r = x0 ), and the choice not to tolerate is what produces bad laws.
Finally, consider the region x ∈ (−, 0). Again it is useful to consider what would happen
if HC were to always set its ideal rule. Then, again, LC would report facts other than the
public signal if and only if doing so would be necessary to obtain its ideal disposition (i.e.,
x0 > 0 if xt ≥ L, and x0 = x if xt < L).3 But here, unlike when x ∈ (0, ), such factfinding
can never be deceptive because if xt ≥ L then xt > 0 as well. Therefore, HC always keeps
the rule at its ideal point and the case never makes bad law.
Having worked through the equilibrium logic, let us step back and consider the implications for the substantive questions motivating the analysis. The most general lesson is that
in a judicial hierarchy with factfinding discretion, unlike in the single-court context, cases
may make bad law even if doctrine is perfectly inclusive (contrast Remark 1). The intuition
is that when the trial court is more informed about case facts than the appellate court, its
strategic factfinding confronts the appellate court with a rule-disposition tradeoff. When
that tradeoff is finely balanced, the appellate court randomizes between sacrificing the disposition to the rule and sacrificing the rule to the disposition, and the latter choice produces
3

In this region, factfinding beyond the public signal can occur with positive probability only if the two
courts’ ideal points are close (namely, if L < ). If L ≥  then the fact that x < 0 implies xt < L, so LC
would always get its preferred disposition under the public signal.
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bad laws. Rule distortion, then, is the result of the trial court’s strategic exploitation of the
appellate court’s uncertainty and the latter’s deferential review of factfinding.
Note that strategic interaction in the judicial hierarchy is necessary for this result; introducing uncertainty about case facts into the single-court context would not have produced
bad laws. In the single-court context with perfectly inclusive doctrine, even if the court receives an arbitrarily noisy signal of case facts, it would still always announce the ideal rule as
long as its signal is accurate in expectation. This follows immediately from expected-utility
maximization and the logic of Section 2.2. In that context, some cases would get the wrong
disposition, but no case would make bad law.
The next important result is that the effect of case difficulty (parametrized by x) on
the quality of lawmaking is nonmonotonic.4 The cases that may make bad law are not the
easiest cases (x > ), nor the most difficult cases (x ∈ (0, x∗ )), but rather intermediately
difficult cases (x ∈ (x∗ , )). When a case is really easy, the public signal accurately conveys
the location of true facts in relation to the appellate court’s ideal rule, and the trial court’s
factfinding cannot change that, so the appellate court never distorts the rule (see Remark
2 and discussion). When a case is really difficult, (1) the equilibrium probability that the
trial court’s factfinding is deceptive is relatively low, and (2) the appellate court would
have to sacrifice a great deal of rule utility to counteract the dispositional effect of the
factfinding, so the court does not distort the rule. Instead, rule distortion occurs in the
intermediate-difficulty range where the probability of deceptive factfinding is relatively high
and a probably-bad disposition can be prevented by a modest sacrifice in rule utility.
Unlike case difficulty (Remark 2), there is no nonzero level of case importance to the trial
or appellate court that would guarantee good lawmaking. For any nonzero value of eh or e` ,
there are regions in the parameter space where the rule is distorted with positive probability.
The final lesson of this section is that when a judicial hierarchy makes bad laws, it makes
laws that are bad for both courts. The distorted rule is bad not just in the sense of deviating
from the higher court’s ideal rule but also in the strong sense of being Pareto-dominated.
4

The effect is also asymmetric. When the public signal is to the left of the appellate court’s ideal rule
(x < 0), bad lawmaking never happens, regardless of case difficulty. The intuition, again, is that in this
region the trial court’s factfinding to help itself also helps the appellate court. By contrast, when the public
signal is to the right of the appellate court’s ideal rule (x > 0), bad law may be made. Of course, the
asymmetry would be on the opposite side if L < 0.
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That is, there are rules that both courts would prefer to the distorted rule. (Namely, when
the rule is distorted, we have r < 0, so there are laws in the interval [0, L], e.g., r = 0,
that both courts would prefer.) This strong form of distortion is required to reverse the
dispositional effect of the trial court’s factfinding and to punish the trial court. A rule on
the Pareto frontier (r ∈ [0, L]) would fail to accomplish both tasks.
Proposition 4 summarizes the insights from the judicial-hierarchy game.
Proposition 4. In the judicial-hierarchy model with perfectly inclusive doctrine,
1. Unlike in the single-court context with perfectly inclusive doctrine, some cases may
make bad law.
2. Very easy cases never make bad law.
3. There is no nonzero level of case importance to the trial court or appellate court that
would guarantee no bad laws.
4. The cases that may make bad law are intermediately difficult.
5. Bad laws are Pareto-dominated.

Proofs
Proof of Remark 2. Note that x < − =⇒ xt < 0 and x >  =⇒ xt > 0, so setting
r = 0 would guarantee the realization of the disposition component of HC’s payoff function.
Because r = 0 is the unique maximizer of the rule component of HC’s payoff function, it
follows that r = 0 is HC’s uniquely optimal action whenever x ∈
/ [−, ].
All statements in Proposition 4 follow from the following characterization of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium:
Proposition 5. The following profile of strategies and beliefs characterizes a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the judicial-hierarchy game with perfectly inclusive doctrine.
1. If x ≥  or x < − then HC sets r = 0 and LC sets x0 = x.
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2. If x ∈ [−, 0) then HC sets r = 0 and LC sets



x0 = x if xt < L

x 0 ≥ 0

∗

3. Define x =



x∗m

if xt ≥ L

f or L ≥ x∗m + 


 2 + L + eh −

p

L2 + e2h + 6Leh

2

.

and x∗m =

f or L < x∗m + 

2
.
eh + 

4. If x ∈ [0, x∗ ], then

• HC sets r =



0

if EUHC (r = 0) ≥ EUHC (r = x0 )


x 0

.

0

if EUHC (r = 0) < EUHC (r = x )
In particular, on the path of play HC sets r = 0.


x −  if xt < L
0
.
• LC sets x =

x
if xt ≥ L
5. If x ∈ (x∗ , ) then



r=0
if EUHC (r = 0) > EUHC (r = x0 )






r = x 0
if EUHC (r = 0) < EUHC (r = x0 )

• HC sets



0 w/ prob. p




r=
if EUHC (r = 0) = EUHC (r = x0 )




0
x w/ prob. 1 − p
−x
where p =
.
e` +  − x
In particular,
on the path of play HC sets r = 0 if x0 = x and


0
w/ prob. p
r=
if x0 = x − .

x −  w/ prob. 1 − p



x0 = x
if xt ≥ L









x −  w/ prob. π1


0

x =
if xt < 0

x
• LC sets
w/ prob. 1 − π1







x −  w/ prob. π2



0

x
=
if xt ∈ [0, L)




x

w/ prob. 1 − π2
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( + x)(x −  + eh )


π 2
( − x)( − x + eh )
where π1 =
L(x −  + eh )


π 2
( − x)( − x + eh )

if x < L − 
.
if x ≥ L − 

6. HC’s beliefs on path are given by Bayes’s rule.
Off path, Pr(xt < 0|x0 ≥ 0) = 0 and if x0 < 0 then xt ∼ U [x − , min{L, x + }).
Proof. The proof verifies that the players’ strategies are best responses for different realizations of x. To begin, note that for any x and any x0 , all rule choices except r = 0 and
r = x0 are dominated for HC. If x0 ≥ 0 then all r > x0 are strictly worse for HC than
r = x0 because r = x0 yields the same disposition and a higher rule utility, and all r < x0
are strictly worse than r = 0 because r = 0 yields the same disposition and a higher rule
utility. If x0 < 0 then all r < x0 are strictly worse than r = x0 because r = x0 yields the same
disposition and a higher rule utility, and all r > x0 are strictly worse than r = 0 because
r = 0 yields the same disposition and a higher rule utility. Therefore, when checking HC’s
deviations, it is sufficient to check r = 0 and r = x0 .
First consider the case x ≥  or x < −. If x ≥  then xt ≥ 0 and x0 ≥ 0; and if
x < − then xt < 0 and x0 < 0, so in both cases HC’s uniquely optimal action is r = 0,
regardless of what LC does. Therefore, x0 = x is a best response for LC.
Next consider the case x ∈ [−, 0). If x ∈ [−, 0) and r = 0 and xt < L then
ULC (x0 = x) = −L + e` = ULC (x0 < 0) > −L = ULC (x0 ≥ 0). If x ∈ [−, 0) and r = 0
and xt ≥ L then ULC (x0 ≥ 0) = −L + e` > −L = ULC (x0 < 0). So LC has no profitable
deviation. As for HC, if x ∈ [−, 0) and x0 = x then EUHC (r = 0) = eh Pr(xt < 0) and
EUHC (r = x0 ) = x + Pr(xt ≥ 0). Consider

two cases separately:

 (1) L ≥ x + , (2) L < x + .
−x
+x
In the first case EUHC (r = 0) =
eh > x +
eh = EUHC (r = x0 ). In the
2
2




L
−x
eh > x +
eh = EUHC (r = x0 ). If
second case EUHC (r = 0) =
L−x+
L−x+
x ∈ [−, 0) and x0 ≥ 0 on the path of play then EUHC (r = 0) = eh = max UHC . Off the
path of play, if x0 < 0 and x0 6= x then r = 0 is a best response by the same reasoning as if
x0 = x; and if x0 ≥ 0 then EUHC (r = 0) = eh = max UHC . We conclude that the strategies
are best responses when x ∈ [−, 0).
Next consider the case x ∈ [0, ). Define x∗ as the value of x such that if LC sets
OA10
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3964820

x0 =



x − 

if xt < L

, a strategy which will be denoted σL , then

if xt ≥ L
EUHC (r = x |σL , x0 = x − , x = x∗ ) = EUHC (r = 0|σL , x0 = x − , x = x∗ ). It will help to

x

0

consider three cases separately: (1) L > 2, (2) L ∈ (x∗m + , 2] (where x∗m will be defined
as the value of x∗ for certain values of L), (3) L ∈ (0, x∗m + ].
In the first case x ∈ [0, ) =⇒ xt < L, so σL becomes x0 = x − . Then setting
2
EUHC (r = 0) = EUHC (r = x0 ) and solving for x yields x∗ =
≡ x∗m . First consider
 + eh
x ∈ [0, x∗m ]. HC’s strategy of choosing between r = 0 and r = x0 is optimal, as argued at the
beginning of the proof. In particular, on the path of play, it follows from the definition of x∗m
that EUHC (r = 0) ≥ EUHC (r = x−). As for LC, ULC (x0 = x−) = −L+e` . Now if LC sets
x0 ≥ 0 then, given off-path beliefs,
HC would set r = 0, so ULC (x0 ≥ 0) = −L. And if LC sets


−L + e`
if r = 0
0
x ∈ (x − , 0) then ULC =
. So LC does not have a profitable devia
x 0 − L
if r = x0
tion, and the parties’ strategies are best responses for x ∈ [0, x∗m ]. If x ∈ (x∗m , ) then for LC
to randomize between x0 = x and x0 = x− we must have EULC (x0 = x) = EULC (x0 = x−),
which is to say −L = Pr(r = 0|x0 = x − )(−L + e` ) + Pr(r = x − |x0 = x − )(x −  − L),
−x
which, denoting Pr(r = 0|x0 = x−) by p, yields p =
. It remains to verify that LC
 − x + e`
does not have a profitable deviation from x0 = x and x0 = x − . If LC sets x0 ≥ 0, x0 6= x
then, given off-path beliefs, HC would set r = 0, so ULC (x0 = x) = ULC (x0 ≥ 0, x0 6= x).
If LC sets x0 ∈ (x − , 0) then, given off-path beliefs and by the definition of x∗m , HC
would set r = x0 , so ULC (x0 ∈ (x − , 0)) = x0 − L < −L = ULC (x0 = x). So LC
does not have a profitable deviation. For HC to randomize between r = 0 and r = x0
in response to x0 = x −  we must have EUHC (r = 0) = EUHC (r = x − ), which
is to say eh Pr(xt < 0) = (x − ) Pr(xt < 0) + (x −  + eh ) Pr(xt ≥ 0), which yields
x −  + eh
Pr(xt < 0|x0 = x − ) =
. Then, using Bayes’s rule, and defining
2eh
(x + )(x −  + eh )
π1 ≡ Pr(x0 = x−|xt < 0) and π2 ≡ Pr(x0 = x−|xt ≥ 0), we obtain π1 =
π2 .
( − x)(eh +  − x)
(It can be verified that π1 > π2 ∀x > x∗m .) It follows that HC’s randomizing between r = 0
and r = x −  is a best response to x0 = x − . To see that r = 0 is a best response to x0 = x,
(1 − π2 )( + x)
note that EUHC (r = 0|x0 = x) = eh Pr(xt ≥ 0|x0 = x) = eh
(1 − π2 )( + x) + (1 − π1 )( − x)
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and EUHC (r = x|x0 = x) = −x + eh Pr(xt < 0|x0 = x) = −x + eh (1 − Pr(xt ≥ 0|x0 = x)).
Because π2 < π1 and  + x >  − x, it follows that Pr(xt ≥ 0|x0 = x) > 1/2, so
EUHC (r = 0|x0 = x) > EUHC (r = x|x0 = x). We see that the strategies are best responses
in the first case.
Now consider the second case, L ∈ (x∗m + , 2]. If x ≤ x∗m then xt < L, so σL becomes
x0 = x− and, by the same reasoning as in the last paragraph, the players’ strategies are best
responses. For x > x∗m we check LC and HC’s strategies in turn. If x > x∗m and xt < L then
for LC to randomize between x0 = x and x0 = x− we must have EULC (x0 = x) = EULC (x0 =
−x
x − ), which by the same reasoning as above yields p =
. Moreover, by the same
 − x + e`
reasoning as above, LC does not have a profitable deviation from x0 = x or x0 = x − . If
x > x∗m and xt ≥ L then ULC (x0 = x) = −L + e` . If LC sets x0 ≥ 0, x0 6= x then, given offpath beliefs, HC would respond by r = 0, so ULC (x0 ≥ 0, x0 6= x) = −L + e` = ULC (x0 = x).
If LC sets x0 ∈ (x − , 0) then, given off-path beliefs, HC would respond by r = x0 , so
ULC (x ∈ (x − , 0)) = x0 − L + e` < ULC (x0 = x). Lastly, EULC (x0 = x − ) = −L + (1 −
p)(x −  + e` ) < ULC (x0 = x). So LC has no profitable deviations. For HC to mix between
r = 0 and r = x −  in response to x0 = x −  we must have EUHC (r = 0) = EUHC (r =
x −  + eh
x − ), which by the same reasoning as above yields Pr(xt < 0|x0 = x − ) =
.
2eh
Now we compute the probability of LC’s factfinding by Bayes’s rule. For x < L − , the
calculation is the same as in the preceding paragraph and yields the same π1 and π2 .
For x ≥ L − , using Bayes’s rule and using π10 and π20 in place of π1 and π2 we obtain
L(x −  + eh )
π10 =
π 0 . (It can be verified that π10 > π20 ∀x > x∗m .) Finally we verify
( − x)(eh +  − x) 2
that r = 0 is HC’s best response to x0 = x. EUHC (r = 0|x0 = x) = eh Pr(xt ≥ 0|x0 =
x) and EUHC (r = x|x0 = x) = −x + eh (1 − Pr(xt ≥ 0|x0 = x)). Now if x < L −  then
(1 − π2 )( + x)
Pr(xt ≥ 0|x0 = x) =
> 1/2, so EUHC (r = 0) > EUHC (r =
(1 − π2 )( + x) + (1 − π1 )( − x)
(1 − π20 )L +  − L + x
x0 ). If x ≥ L− then Pr(xt ≥ 0|x0 = x) =
> 1/2, so
(1 − π20 )L +  − L + x + (1 − π10 )( − x)
EUHC (r = 0) > EUHC (r = x0 ). We see that HC has no profitable deviations. The players’
strategies are best responses in the second case.
Lastly consider the case L ∈ (0, x∗m + ]. First we calculate x∗ which, recall, is the
value of x that solves EUHC (r = 0|σL , x0 = x − ) = EUHC (r = x0 |σL , x0 = x − ). The
equation yields eh Pr(xt < 0|x0 = x − ) = x −  + eh Pr(xt ≥ 0|x0 = x − ). We now
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use Bayes’s rule to compute Pr(xt ≥ 0|x0 = x − ). Noting that x < L −  =⇒ x <
x∗m =⇒ EUHC (r = 0) > EUHC (r = x − ), we need only consider the case where x ≥ L − ,
−x
which yields Pr(xt < 0|x0 = x − ) =
. Plugging this back into the equation for
−x+L
p
2 + L + eh − L2 + e2h + 6Leh
x∗ yields x∗ =
. Next we verify that the players’ strategies
2
are best responses. If x ≤ x∗ then the strategies are best responses by the same reasoning
as before. For x > x∗ we check LC and HC’s strategies in turn. For LC, the derivation
of p and the showing that LC does not have a profitable deviation are the same as in the
preceding paragraph. For HC, we consider x0 = x −  and x0 = x in turn. To randomize
between r = 0 and r = x −  in response to x0 = x −  requires EUHC (r = 0|x0 = x − ) =
EUHC (r = x − |x0 = x − ). Using Bayes’s rule as before, noting that x > L − , and
denoting π10 = Pr(x0 = x − |xt < 0) and π20 = Pr(x0 = x − |xt ∈ [0, L)), we obtain
L(x −  + eh )
π10 =
π 0 . Note that this is the same as π10 and π20 calculated in the
( − x)(eh +  − x) 2
preceding paragraph. Now if 
x0 = x then we must show that 
EUHC (r = 0) ≥ EUHC (r = x).
0
(1 − π1 )( − x)
Note that EUHC (r = x) =
eh − x and EUHC (r = 0) =
0
(1 − 
π1 )( − x) +  + x − π20 L

(1 − π10 )( − x)
(1 − π10 )( − x)
< 1/2,
1−
e
.
Noting
that
h
(1 − π10 )( − x) +  + x − π20 L
(1 − π10 )( − x) +  + x − π20 L
it follows that EUHC (r = 0) > EUHC (r = x). This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 4. The statements follow immediately from the equilibrium
characterization in Proposition 5:
1. Cases in the range x ∈ (x∗ , ) make bad law (r 6= 0) with positive probability.
2. Cases where x ∈
/ [−, ] never make bad law. (More generally than in the specified
equilibrium, this statement follows from Remark 2.)
3. Cases in the range x ∈ (x∗ , ) make bad law with positive probability whenever
eh 6= 0 and e` 6= 0.
4. The region where bad law is made with positive probability is an intermediate region
of the public signal and hence of case facts, namely x ∈ (x∗ , ).
5. When bad law is made, the result is r = x −  < 0, which is Pareto-dominated by some
r ∈ [0, L], for example by r = 0.
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